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THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE IN UNITED STATES
DOMESTIC LAW
John H. Jackson*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 "GATT," is a
multilateral international agreement which is today the principal instrument for the regulation of world trade. Over eighty
nations, including the United States, participate in GATT and it
has been estimated that about eighty per cent of world trade is
governed by this agreement.2 With the recent completion of five
agonizing years of "Kennedy Round" 3 tariff negotiations under
GATT auspices, tariffs for many goods will be reduced to a point
where they will no longer be effective barriers to world trade.~ For
this reason, non-tariff trade barriers of wide variety and ingenuity5
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D.
1959, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 57, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
The author is indebted to Walter Hollis, Legal Advisor's Office, United States State
Department, who generously read the manuscript of this article and made a number of
useful suggestions. The author is also indebted to members of the CATT Secretariat
in Geneva for assisting his general research into GATT.-J.H.J.
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1967); 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as GAT'I). CATT has been extensively
amended and modified, as can be seen from app. C. A more current version of CATT
can be found in CATT, 3 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (rev. vol. 1958)
(hereinafter referred to as BISD). Subsequent changes may be found in CATT Doc.
IPRO/65-1 (1965) (which added pt. IV) and CATT Doc. INT(61) 34 (1961) (which
modified art. XIV:1).
Although the full text of GATT is not being reprinted in this article, the general
subject matter of each article can be seen from the table in app. A. On GATT generally, see Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal Aspects of a Surprising Institution, 1
J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 (1967) and authorities cited therein. For an economist's view,
see G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (1965). As to CATT documents
in general and their availability, see GATT Docs. INF/121 & INF/122 (1966); Jackson,
supra at 131 n.2.
2. Statement issued by the Director General of CATT, CATT Press Release 990,
reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at 20, col. 3; GATT Press release 973 (Nov. I,
1966).
3. See Farnsworth, Kennedy Round Succeeds, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at I, col. 8.
See also International Monetary Fund, Kennedy Round Agreements, 19 INT'L FINANCIAL
NEWS SURVEY 213 (1967).
4. See Statement by Eric Wyndham-White, Director General of CATT, to the
Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Auswiirtige Politik at Bad Godesberg, GATT Doc. INT(66)
567 (Oct. 27, 1967); address by Eric Wyndham-White at the meeting of the Trade
Negotiating Committee at Geneva, CATT Press Release 993, at 4 (June 30, 1967); Chase
Manhattan Bank, Perspective on World Business, 7 WORLD Bus. 3 (July 1967).
5. See, e.g., Lawrence, State "Buy U.S." Laws on Increase, J. Commerce, June 15,
1967, at 1, col. 2. See also Not for State Capitals, J. Commerce, July 25, 1967, at 4, col. 1;
Lawrence, Anti-dumping Code Foes Face Stiff Odds, J. Commerce, July 5, 1967, at 1, col.
1; Lawrence, No U.S. Push on Non-tariff Walls Likely, J. Commerce, July 3, 1967, at
1, col. 7; Revised Wool Import Testing Rule Reviewed, J. Commerce, June 28, 1967,
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are now becoming relatively more significant.6 In the United States,
federal, state, and local legislators and officials, under pressure from
special interest protectionists, have been experimenting with various
types of barriers on foreign imports.7 Since much of the general
language of GATT concerns non-tariff barriers, GATT's position
in United States domestic law8 may well take on increasing importance. However, determining the status of GATT in domestic law
is a surprisingly complex problem, partly because of uncertainties
that still lurk in our constitutional law relating to executive agreements, 9 and partly for reasons unique to GATT. 10
GATT was negotiated at Geneva in 1947 at the same time that
the final preliminary draft of the Charter for the International
Trade Organization (ITO) was being prepared.11 GATT was
intended to embody concrete tariff commitments within the frameat II, col. 4; Milche, Buy U.S. Laws: A.re They Legal, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1967, at
lF, col. l; Reed, President Orders a Slash in Imports of Dairy Products, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
6. There have been over 100 bills introduced in the current session of Congress
relating to non-tariff import restrictions of one kind or another. See CCH CoNGRES·
SIONAL INDEX for the 90th Congress under the subject headings Dairies a- Dairy Prod.,
Imports c- Importation, and Meat c- Meat Prod.
7. &e cases cited in notes 261-64 infra; articles cited in note 5 supra; discussion in
text at pt. m.B. In August 1967 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a bill which would
have required all state-financed projects in Pennsylvania to use only steel produced
in the United States. The bill was vetoed, however, in response to State Department
opposition. Walker, Steel Bill Vetoed in Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1967, at
·U, col. 1.
8. Often the tenn "municipal law" is used by international lawyers to describe
the law of one country as distinguished from international law. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1966). The term "national law" is also used.
See w. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1965, 191 in 2 ACAD·
EMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES CoURS (1965). In this article the term
"domestic law" is used synonymously with "municipal law" and "national law" and
unless the context indicates otherwise will refer to United States domestic law.
"Domestic law" seems to be more understandable to the American lawyer and is the
term used by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW, Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
9. See, e.g., E. BYRD, TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1960); w. McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941); MacDougal & Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. I & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945); Comment,
Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 34 U. Cm. L REv. 580 (1967); Note, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 505 (1961).
10. In particular, the Protocol of Provisional Application and art. XXIV, para. 12
of GATT introduce complexities. See the discussion in text at pt. III, especially pts.

111.A.2 & 111.B.2.
11. The relationship of the preparatory work for the International Trade Organization (ITO) and that for GATT is described in Jackson, supra note I, at 134. Four
international conferences were held to draft the ITO Charter. The first three of these
conferences were officially titled Meetings of the Preparatory Committee, and were held
in London from October 15 to November 26, 1946; in Lake Success, New York from
January 20 to February 25, 1947; and in Geneva from April IO to October 30, 1947.
Most of GATT was actually negotiated at Geneva, but portions of the preparatory
work at the previous two meetings are also relevant.

252

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:249

work of the ITO when the latter came into existence.12 The United
States failed to aq:ept the ITO Charter, however, and the ITO
conseque11tly failed to materialize; 13 thus, GATT became, by default, the general regulatory institution for world trade, filling the
gap left by the demise of the ITO. This misdirected beginning, the
political sensitivity and trade protectionism in the United States
in the late 1940's, and the shifting of the power over foreign economic affairs from the legislative to the executive branch in this
country14 all caused GATT to be established in a halting "provisional" manner that continues to make it an anomaly among major
international institutions.15
This article will undertake a two-step analysis. First, in Part II,
the question whether GATT is legally a part of United States
domestic law will be examined. Then, assuming GATT is part of
this law, Part III will examine the extent of GATT's domestic
law effect and its general relationship to other law, both federal
and state. The chosen focus of this article thus excludes treatment
of substantive obligations under specific GATT clauses.16 It also
excludes intensive development of the myriad details of the scope
of executive authority to negotiate particular trade concessions
under legislation such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,17 especially since the extent of this authority is perhaps more heavily
12. For instance, para. 2 of GA'IT, art. XXIX states: "Part II of this agreement
shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter enters into force.''
13. The Administration had repeatedly stated to Congress that, while GA'IT was
being negotiated pursuant to authority which the Executive already possessed, the
ITO would be submitted to Congress for approval. S. REP. No. 107, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. II, at 4 (1949) (minority report); Hearings on House Joint Resolution 2,6
Providing for Membership and Participation by the U.S. in the ITO Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong., 2d Sess, (1950); Hearings Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 549-50 (1949); Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947); Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). Finally, however, the executiye
branch decided not to resubmit the ITO to Congress. State Department Press Release,
Dec. 6, 1950, reprinted in 23 DEP'T OF STATE :BULL, 977 (1950); Hearings Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 1247 (1951). For a further description of the causes behind the clecision not to submit the ITO, see R. GARDNER, STERLING
Dou.AR DIPLOMACY (1956); Diebold, The End of the ITO (Princeton Essays in International Finance No. 16, 1952).
14. See text accompanying notes 27 & 135 infra.
15. See discussion in text at pt. ID.A.2; Jackson, supra note 1. Provisional application means, among other things, that a nation may withdraw upon only sixty days
notice. Protocol of Provisio-!lal Application, 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S.
308 (1950).
16. Examination of certain of the clauses may be found in Jackson, supra note I.
17. See list of statutes in app. D. The U.S. Tariff Schedules in GATT contain
literally tens of thousands of items, and the question can be raised as to executive
authority to negotiate any one of them. There are a number of especially interesting
cases, many of which do not appear on the record and are known only to government
officials who have spent lifetimes dealing with the subject.
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dependent upon executive-congressional political relationships than
upon legal notions.
II. GATT AS UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
Even though GATT is binding on the United States under international law,18 it could fail to be effective as domestic law if
either the agreement were not validly entered into under United
States constitutional law or, though validly entered into and recognized by this country as an international legal obligation, it were
not under its own terms or for United States constitutional reasons,
domestic law. 19
A. Authority for United States Participation in GATT

It is generally settled that under our Constitution international
"treaty"20 obligations can be established in any of the following
ways: (I) an agreement negotiated by the President, with advice
and consent by a two-thirds vote in the Senate; (2) an executive
agreement of the President, acting under authority delegated by an
act of Congress; and (3) an executive agreement of the President,
acting under his constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs. 21
The adherence of the United States to GATT rests upon the socalled "Protocol of Provisional Application," which was signed in
Geneva October 30, 1947.22 GATT has never been submitted to the
Senate; in fact, there was never even a plan to do so.23 Thus the
18. It is accepted, by some at least, that a nation may be bound under international law to a treaty, even though it has not followed its own internal constitutional or domestic law in accepting the treaty. See International Law Commission of
the United Nations, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, UN
Doc. A/6309/Rev. I, reproduced in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 291 (comment 9 to art. II)
(1967): R.EsTATEMENT § 123. GATT was made effective by the Protocol of Provisional
Application, which was signed by the requisite number of states to bring it into
effect, including the signature of the United States representative with full powers.
55 U.N.T.S. 308, 312 (1950). See also Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1092 (1949).
19. R.EsTATEMENT § 141; BISHOP, supra note 8, at 201.
20. The term "treaty" has two senses. On the one hand it is a generic term referring to all international agreements. See International Law Commission, supra
note 18, at comment 2 to art. 2. This is the use in the text above. On the other hand,
in the United States constitutional law sense the word "treaty" refers only to those
international agreements to which the Senate must and does give its "advice and
consent." This country, then, can enter into "treaty" obligations in the international
sense without Senate consent. See R.EsTATEMENT § 123 (comment).
21. See RESTATEMENT §§ 130, 131; MacDougal &: Lans, supra note 9.
22. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950). The Protocol was signed
on behalf of the United States by Winthrop Brown, then Chief, Division of Commer•
cial Policy, Dep't of State, who acted with full powers.
23. See State Department Press Release, Dec. 13, 1945, reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 970 (1945), announcing that invitations had been sent to a group of countries
for negotiations on trade matters, and stating: "The latter agreements, so far as the
United States is concerned, would be negotiated under the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
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authority for American participation in GATT must stem from
one of the two types of executive agreement mentioned above.
Representatives of the executive branch have not always displayed
certainty as to the true legal basis for GATT: some have stated that
the executive agreement was based entirely upon congressional
authorization; 24 others have said that the basis, at least in part, was
the independent constitutional power of the President to conduct
foreign affairs. 25

I. Congressional Delegation of Authority to the President
The United States Constitution provides in article I that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports
and Excises [and] . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ...." 26 Thus, it seems clear that congressional participation
is essential for entry into any broad and detailed international trade
agreement, such as GATT. But, although Congress at one time
legislated tariff matters in great detail, this, as its own members
have stated, proved to be unsatisfactory. Not only was it unduly
burdensome, but the results by any fair appraisal were abominable.
As one Senator put it in 1934:
[O]ur experience in writing tariff legislation ... has been discouraging. Trading between groups and sections is inevitable. Log-rolling
is inevitable, and in its most pernicious form. We do not write a
national tariff law. We jam together, through various unholy alliances and combinations a potpourri or hodgepodge of section and
local tariff rates, which often add to our troubles and increase world
misery ....27

Consequently, in the last three decades, there has been an accelerating shift of power over foreign economic affairs from Congress to
the executive. Moreover, because of GATT's unusual and unexpected origin, Congress has played a relatively minor role in the
ments Act." See also statements made by executive branch spokesmen in Hearings on
the International Trade Organization Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 70-74 (1947): Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
24. 94 CONG. R.Ec. 12662 (1949).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1955): Hearings on Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1153 (1951); Hearings on the Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051 (1949); Statement by the
Legal Advisor to the State Department, reprinted in Hearings of the Senate Finance
Comm. on the ITO, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-76 (1947). See also app. B for the State
Department analysis of authority for entry into GATT on an article-by-article basis.
26. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
27. 78 CONG. R.Ec. 10379 (1934) (remarks of Senator Cooper), quoted in S, REP, No.
258, 78th Cong., 1st Scss. 49 (1943).
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development of our relationship with GATT as an instrument of
United States policy. 28 While admittedly these factors must be
distinguished from the legal questions involved, their presence must
also be noted since it colors those legal questions and influences the
advocates of differing legal positions.
The basic congressional delegation of power relied upon by the
President in accepting the GATT Protocol of Provisional Application is contained in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as
amended and extended for three years in 1945.29 The acceptance by
28. Congressional complaints about this can be found sprinkled throughout the
large number of hearings on extensions of the Trade Agreements Acts from 1947
down to the present. For some particularly salient examples, see H.R. REP. No. 2007,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1956) (supplemental views of Representative Thomas B.
Curtis); Hearings on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1096 (1951); Hearings on the Extension of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1253 (1949).
29. 59 Stat. 410 (1945). See app. D for a complete listing of the citations to the
successive trade agreements acts. The basic trade agreements authority delegated by
the 1945 statute was in the following terms:
Sec, 350. (a) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of
the United States (as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring
the American standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and
the present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the
American public, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among
various branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce) by
regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States in accordance
with the characteristics and needs of various branches of American production
so that foreign markets will be made available to those branches of American
production which require and are capable of developing such outlets by affording
corresponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United States, the
President, whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import
restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening
and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purpose
above declared will be promoted by that means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time(!) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or
instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and for
such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any article
covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out
any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into hereunder. No
proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than 50 per_centum
any rate of duty, however established, existing on January I, 1945 (even though
temporarily suspended by Act of Congress), or transferring any article between
the dutiable and free lists. The proclaimed duties and other import restrictions
shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries, whether imported directly or indirectly: Provided, That the President may
suspend the application to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any
country because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce or because
of other acts including the operation of international cartels or policies which in
his opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this section; and the proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect from and after such
time as is specified in the proclamation. The President may at any time terminate
any such proclamation in whole or in part.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the application, with
respect to rates of duty established under this section pursuant to agreements with
countries other than Cuba, of the provisions of the treaty of commercial reciprocity concluded between the United States and the Republic of Cuba on Decem-
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the United States of subsequent amendments to GATT depends on
later versions of this Act, and will be discussed below.80 The question before us at this point, then, is whether this 1945 Statute
authorized the President to bind the United States to GATT, which
at the time consisted of approximately 45,00031 tariff concessions
(commitments as to maximum tariffs on items listed) and thirty-four
(later thirty-five) articles obligating the signatory governments on
such matters as most-favored-nation treatment, non-discrimination
in internal taxation, quantitative restrictions on imports, duties of
consultation with other signatories, and duties to act "jointly" with
other parties to GATT in certain situations.82 If this question is
answered in the negative, then the source of authority must be
sought in the President's independent constitutional powers or in
other legislation.88
Legal attacks on the argument that our adherence to GATT is
properly based upon this Statute have usually been on two fronts:
(I) the Statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power; 34
ber II, 1902, or to preclude giving effect to an exclusive agreement with Cuba
concluded under this section, modifying the existing preferential customs treatment of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba: Provided,
That the duties on such an article shall in no case be increased or decreased by
more than 50 per centum of the duties, however established, existing on
January 1, 1945 (even though temporarily suspended by Act of Congress).
(c) As used in this section, the term "duties and other import restrictions"
includes (I) rate and form of import duties and classification of articles, and
(2) limitations, prohibitions, charges, and exactions other than duties, imposed
on importation or imposed for the regulation of imports.
(d) (1) When any rate of duty has been increased or decreased for the duration of war or an emergency, by agreement or otherwise, any further increase
or decrease shall be computed upon the basis of the post-war or post-emergency
rate carried in such agreement or otherwise.
(2) Where under a foreign trade agreement the United States has reserved
the unqualified right to withdraw or modify, after the termination of war or
an emergency, a rate on a specific commodity, the rate on such commodity to be
considered as "existing on January I, 1945" for the purpose of this section shall
be the rate which would have existed if the agreement had not been entered into.
(3) No proclamation shall be made pursuant to this section for the purpose of
carrying out any foreign trade agreement the proclamation with respect to
which has been terminated in whole by the President prior to the date this
subsection is enacted.
30. See discussion in text at pt. lI.A.3.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 2009, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948).
32. See app. A for list of the GATT articles and their general subject matter. See
also note I supra.
The strongest legal battles over the validity of GATT have been fought not in
the courts, but in the congressional hearings. See the list of renewal acts and related
House and Senate Reports in app. D. See also Hearing on the ITO Before the
House Foreign Affairs Comm., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Hearings on Operation of
the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947).
33. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.2.
34. See Hearings on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1943); Hearings on the Extension of
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(2) an agreement such as GATT is beyond the scope of the authority
delegated by the Statute. At least one court has upheld this Statute
in the face of the constitutional argument. 35 Indeed, the history of
similar delegations, which goes back almost to the beginning of the
Republic, 36 and several Supreme Court opinions37 rendered on
similar statutes confirm the many memoranda38 contained in the
congressional committee reports on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its extensions which conclude that the Statute is not
challengeable for unconstitutionality.
The second line of attack, that GATT goes beyond the authority delegated by the Statute, is more complex. The arguments that
the Statute does not delegate such power can be sorted into three
groups: (1) GATT is a multilateral agreement, whereas the Act
authorized only bilateral agreements; (2) various specific substantive clauses of GATT go beyond the statutory authorization (for
example, provisions on quantitative restrictions, national treatment
of imported goods, dumping, and customs valuation); and (3)
GATT is an international organization, with voting and other administrative clauses, and the United States executive was given no
authority to enter such an organization. Let us deal first with the
multilateral question.
By the time the trade agreements authority was renewed in
1945, this country had entered into thirty-two separate trade agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its extenthe Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 76th Cong.,
lid Sess. 698 (1940); Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1934).
35. Starkist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P.A. 52 (1959). See also Note, 61
COLUM. L, REv. 505 (1961).
36. See S. REP, No. 1297, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940); Hearings on Extension of
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1095 (1949); memorandum of the State Department entitled Congressional
Legislation and Reciprocal Executive Agreements Concerning Tariff and Related
Matters, reprinted in Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1934). The effect of practice over a period of
time was succinctly stated by Secretary Dulles when, in reference to the Trade Agreements Acts, he said: "I don't believe that this law which has remained on the books
21 years unchallenged is unconstitutional ••••" Hearings on the Trade Agreements
Extension Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1252 (1955).
37. Hampton &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649 (1892).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. app. G, at 113 (1956); Hearings
on the Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1059 (1949); Hearings on Extension of the Trade Agreements
Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Scss. 470-71 (1948); Hearings
on Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 729 (1940); State and Justice Departments memoranda reprinted
in Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1934). See also Note, 61 COLUM, L. REv. 505 (1961).
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sions since the original Act was adopted in 1934.311 Except for an
agreement with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union,40 these
agreements were all bilateral. A search of the legislative history for
the 1945 Act, as well as that for the predecessor enactments in 1934,
1937, 1940, and 1943, reveals no explicit mention of the possibility
of a multilateral agreement pursuant to the authority delegated,
although one statement spoke of the agreements being "reciprocal
rather than bilateral."41 On the other hand, several statements in
the 1945 legislative history refer to the Act as one of several postwar
economic policy building blocks, side by side with such others as
the Bretton-Woods Agreements, which did set up two multilateral
organizations.42 In addition, some of the early congressional criticism of the trade agreements program was directed at the mostfavored-nation policy, which allowed some nations to reap the
benefits of bilateral negotiations between the United States and
third countries.43 The logical way to prevent these "free rides" was
to develop some sort of multilateral procedure for negotiation. 44 All
39. These agreements are listed in Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 932 (1945).
40. Agreement between the United States of America and the Belgo-Luxembourg
Union. 49 Stat. 3680 (1935).
41. 91 CoNG. R.Ec. 5049 (1945). See app. D for a list of the acts and some of their
legislative history.
42. Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46, 819 (1945); 91 CONG.
R.Ec. 4885, 6019 (1945).
43. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1945); Hearings of the House Ways
and Means Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 432, 819, 837 (1945); 91 CONG. R.Ec. 4979,
5049, 5086, 5089, 5100, 5142, 6210 (1945).
44. The policy of unconditional most-favored-nation application of foreign trade
agreements was adopted by the United States in 1923 [91 CONG. R.Ec. 4979 (1945)],
and enacted into law as § 350(a){2) of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 943. The statute provides: "The proclaimed duties and other import
restrictions shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign
countries, whether imported directly or indirectly •.•." The most favored nation
clause was typically worded like that in the United States-Mexico Reciprocal Trade
Agreement of 1942 (57 Stat. 833) which read:
\Vith respect to customs duties •.• [etc.] any advantage, favor, privilege, or
immunity which has been or may hereafter be granted by the United States of
America or the United Mexican States to any article originating in or destined
for any third country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like article originating in or destined for the United Mexican States or the
United States of America, respectively.
Id. at 835. Thus, if the United States agreed with Great Britain that it would limit
the amount of tariff on widgets to 10%, it was committed by the MFN clause in
various other treaties to limit its tariff on widgets to the same amount when those
widgets were imported from those other countries. If the United States negotiated
with Great Britain for the lowering of widget tariffs, it would usually receive some
benefit or concession in return from Great Britain. But if the percentage of its total
imports of widgets which originated in Great Britain were 50%, then another 50%
of widget imports would come in under the same duty reduction, without anything
having been received in compensation to the United States. The rationale or justification for this type of policy is that when all trading partners apply it, then the United
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things considered, however, it is understandable that Congress was
surprised when, less than six months after it extended the Trade
Agreements Act without discussion of the possibility of a multilateral trade agreement, it learned that the executive branch had
called on fifteen other nations to join with it in multilateral tariff
negotiations.411
From examining the text of the Statute,46 one can see that it
places no explicit hurdle against multilateral trade agreements.
Furthermore, it was stressed in testimony before the congressional
committee47 that the 1947 GATT negotiations would in reality be
"bilateral," as before, with the results of the many bilateral negotiations simply drawn together in one instrument, for the sake of
convenience. Even an opposing Congressman commented that
merely because the result was one instrument signed by all, did
not in itself mean that the President had exceeded his statutory
authority.48 Thus, one can conclude that GATT does not go beyond
the statutory authority merely because of its multilateral nature.
A more serious statutory assault on GATT is the argument that
specific provisions of GATT exceed the authority delegated to the
President by the Trade Agreements Act. Careful analysis is required to evaluate this argument, but to discuss each clause of
GATT here would be tedious and lengthy. Appendix A outlines
the sources, if the reader wishes to pursue the matter as to any
specific article of GATT. Without reference to specific GATT provisions, however, the arguments for the statutory validity of our
adherence to GATT can be summarized as follows: (1) the language
States also reaps the benefit of negotiated concessions between other countries. Nevertheless, there is the danger of the free ride by third parties whenever the United States
negotiates a tariff concession with another country. One way to prevent this is to
develop multilateral negotiations (as was done in GATI), so that a tentative concession could be arranged between country A and country B, and then the importing
country could go to its other trading partners who exported the same item and ask
for compensatory concessions for the advantage they would receive by the lower tariff
on those items. Thus if country B and C each exported 50% of the imports of widgets
into A, and A negotiated a tentative tariff concession with B, A could then go to C
during the multilateral negotiations and ask for some compensatory concession for
the advantage C would receive by the lowering of the tariff on the widget.
45. State Department Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reproduced in 13 DEP'T STATE
970 (1945). See also Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and
the Proposed International Trade Organization Before the House Foreign Affairs
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1947).
46. See note 29 supra.
47. Hearings on Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO
Before the House Ways c- Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-95, 235 (1947).
48. Id. at 235. The author has been informed that United States participation
in the multilateral Universal Postal Union is also based on statutes which had been
drafted with bilateral agreements in mind. This could be a precedent for GATT
participation.
BULL.
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of the Statute can be read to permit United States entry into GATT,
since it authorizes "trade agreements" either without explicit limitation or with limitations that can be interpreted not to preclude an
agreement such as GATT; (2) the legislative history shows that
provisions such as those in GATT were contemplated by Congress;
(3) prior trade agreements known to Congress had provisions like
those of GATT, thus further evidencing congressional intent;
(4) later actions of Congress can be taken as recognizing or accepting
GATT; and (5) several court cases, while not directly litigating the
validity of GATT, have resulted in decisions and opinions that
necessarily imply its validity.
In a very real sense, one of the most telling arguments is simply
the passage of time. The practice today of all three branches of our
government recognizes the legal existence of GATT; 49 to disown
GATT at this point would be a jolt to this nation's foreign policy
and, indeed, to the stability of international economic relations
throughout most of the world. While the political arms of the
government might administer such a jolt, one can only conclude
that, in any imaginable test of GATT's legality in American courts,
the agreement as a whole will continue to be upheld. The legal
arguments, however, can directly influence the future scope and
extent of the impact of GATT. Additionally, legal arguments illustrate aspects of the congressional-executive relationship concerning
GATT which have already affected GATT to a great extent and
which will continue to do so.
The statutory language. The language of the Statute is curiously
bifurcated in form: it makes two grants of power to the President, 50
first to "enter into foreign trade agreements," and second "to proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions ... as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign
trade agreement . . . ." Then follow certain limitations on the
power to proclaim.51
It has been argued52 that the first clause is unlimited: the
President is given the power to enter into any "foreign trade
49. As to the effect of passage of time on the legal issue, see note 36 supra. The
executive branch initiated GATT and has, of course, continuously argued for its
validity. When faced with a GATT question, the judiciary has assumed the valid
existence of GATT. See notes 108 &: 109 infra and accompanying text. As for Congress,
even it today recognizes and relies on the validity of GATT; for example, legislation
authorizing the Kennedy Round would make little sense unless the background of
GATT existed. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
50. See § 350(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945, quoted in
note 29 supra.
51. Id.
52. Memorandum of the Department of State, printed in H.R. REP. No. 2007,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956).
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agreement," the only limitation on this power being implicit in
the definition of "foreign trade agreement." This does not necessarily mean that the President could carry out all parts of such
an agreement (for instance, domestic legal action might be necessary
to do so), but merely that he has the authority to obligate the
United States in the international sense to anything that can reasonably be called a "foreign trade agreement." If this be the case, it
is possible to test the validity of GATT as an international obligation by checking each of its parts to see if it appropriately belongs
in a "foreign trade agreement." Historical examples would help
define "trade agreement," and the analysis below as to prior trade
agreements known to Congress53 would certainly be relevant, although not determinative. The broadest scope that can be argued
for the Statute is that anything that affects foreign trade (and, as
nations are learning, there is little that does not) 54 is appropriate in
a foreign trade agreement. The provisions of GATT would fall
easily within this definition.
Arguably, the definition of "trade agreement" is much more
restricted: it is possible to read the limiting language in the second
clause, relating to the proclamation power, as also attaching to the
grant of power in the first clause. The propriety of this reading is
reinforced by the notion that it is idle (or worse, bad policy) to
authorize the President to commit the United States internationally
without giving him sufficient means to carry out this commitment;
such would be the case if the powers of implementation were restricted in a way that the power to agree was not. This interpretation would result in limiting the President's authority to enter into
"trade agreements" to those agreements concerned with "duties and
import restrictions." An examination of GATT provisions, however, reveals that most of the general articles~ 5 can be justified as
5!1. See text following note 72 infra.
54. Even interest rates in the respective countries are now becoming a subject
of international understanding or agreement. See Cowan, U.S. and 4 Nations Join
To Seek Cuts in Interest Rates, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 8. The potential
broad reach of this argument was recognized in the 1949 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1156:
Senator Millikin: I think you gave us a measuring stick a while ago that
gave us, as I see it, a glimpse of your philosophy. Is it your contention that you
can take any economic situation, any place, and say that this puts a hindrance
upon trade, or puts up a hurdle to trade, export or import, and that if you find
that to be a fact you can make an agreement of any nature that in our [sic]
opinion will remove or tend to remove that hurdle?
Mr. Brown: No, sir.
55. The original General Agreement, as drafted at Geneva in 1947 and implemented
on January 1, 1948, contained thirty-four articles. As a result of some changes made
in 1948, a new article, art. 35, was added to GATT. Since this article was added so
soon after the origin of GATT, it is generally considered that GATT has always
had thirty-five articles. Today, of course, due to the addition of pt. IV to GATT,
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embraced within the term "import restriction." 116 Of the remaining
articles, some merely contain exceptions to commitments against
tariff or non-tariff barriers and thus are within the statutory language.117 The articles which deal with administrative matters, such
as consultation over disputes, accession of new parties, "waivers,"
amendments, and withdrawal, however, are the hardest to bring
within the statutory language. Clearly, some of these provisions may
be implicitly authorized as essentially concomitant to any foreign
agreement, especially a foreign trade agreement. 158
The scope of executive authority might also be limited by statutes other than the Trade Agreements Act, however, most such
problems were avoided when Part II of GATT, the "trade conduct
code" containing most of the questionable articles, was made subject to "existing legislation." 159 Likewise, the President might turn
to other statutes to expand the scope of his authority to enter trade
agreements, as appears necessary to support the GATT clauses that
deal with export controls.60
In sum, looking only at the explicit language of the statutory
delegation, the argument that GATT is within its scope as a "trade
agreement" appears persuasive. But even if one chooses to apply
other limiting language in the Statute to the scope of authority to
enter agreements, most of GATT can be justified under the express
language.
Legislative history. It is clear from the legislative proceedings in
1945 that Congress contemplated that provisions in trade agreements
which came into force in June 1966, GATT has a total of thirty-eight articles. See
note 160 infra. In addition, there arc the various annexes and bulky schedules of tariff
concessions which are incorporated by reference.
56. The general subject matter of each article is stated in app. A, which also
indicates a congressional justification or precedent for each article. As to the limits
of tariff cutting authority, see DEP'T OF STATE, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE (Commercial Policy Series 109, Publ. No. 2983, 1947), which
states that the limits on executive negotiating power as to tariff rates were observed.
57. If authority exists to negotiate on a subject, such authority would seem usually
to extend to negotiating exceptions to commitments regarding the subject.
58. See discussion in text at pt. ill.A.2; note 56 supra; text following note 111 infra.
59. See discussion in text at pt. m.A.2; lists of "inconsistent legislation" cited in
notes 250 &: 251 infra.
60. GATT articles and paragraphs which mention "exports" are 1:1, VI:l; VI:5;
VI:6(b); VI:7(a); VIII:1 8: 4; IX:2; XIII:1; XI:l; XVI:B; XX:i. At the time GATT
was negotiated, the President had authority to govern exports under § 6(d) of the
Act of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 714, as amended by 56 Stat. 463 (1942) and 61 Stat. 946
(1947). A thorough study of United States export controls can be found in Bermann
8: Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 Couru. L.
REv. 791 (1967). See also app. A. President Truman's 1947 Proclamation of GATT
relies not only on § 350 of the Tariff Act [19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964)], but also upon
§ 304(3) [19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964)] which embodied a 1938 amendment relating to
marking requirements.
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authorized under the Statute would go considerably beyond tariff
concessions. Not only did Congress have before it previously negotiated trade agreements with extensive non-tariff provisions, 61 but
criticisms of these agreements as well as other statements made in
committee hearings show clearly that Congress was cognizant of the
importance of non-tariff barriers to international trade and of the
dangers of tariff concessions being effectively nullified by import
quotas, currency devaluations, and other ingenious devices. 62 One
Congressman listed twenty-nine trade barriers that he claimed had
been used against the United States. 63 To have concluded a foreign
trade agreement without provisions to protect the value of tariff
concessions would have run counter to congressional intent; indeed,
American negotiators at Geneva in 1947 refused to enter into tariff
commitments without the protection of the general provisions which
were included in the GATT agreement. 64 Likewise, there was considerable discussion in Congress about the most-favored-nation
clause65 and about the "escape clause" 66 (including an informal
commitment by the Administration to include the escape clause in
all future trade agreements). 61 In fact, most of the individual provisions of GATT, when matched against pertinent legislative history, relate to specific discussions in the latter (see Appendix A).
61. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
62. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 51 (1945): 91 CONG. REc. 4876
(remarks of Congressman Knutson), 4886 (remarks of Congressman Robertson),
4998-99 (remarks of Congressman Reed), 5070 (remarks of Congressman Curtis) (1945);
Hearings on the Extension of the Redprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42, 83, 92 (1945); Hearing on the Extension
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 194, 226, 307, 309, 409, 576, 2337, 2339 (1945).
63. 91 CONG. REc. 4999 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Reed).
64. Meeting of the Trade Agreement Committee in Geneva, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV/3, at 17-19 (1947). Preparatory materials for drafting GATT, which were
prepared in 1946-1947 under the auspices of the United Nations, bear the document
identification U.N. Doc. E/PC/T. For purposes of simplification, these documents
will be cited as EPCT/.
65. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 4979 (remarks
of Congressman Cooper), 5049 (remarks of Congressman Mills), 5086 (remarks of
Congressman McCormack), 5100 (remarks of Congressman Lewis), 5142 (remarks of
Congressman Hale), 6210 (remarks of Congressman Thomas) (1945); Hearings on the
Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 432, 819, 837 (1945).
66. H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 4872, 4891
(1945); Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 86, 90, 459 (1945); Hearings on the
Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements A.ct Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Scss. 273 (1945).
67. 91 CoNG. REc. 4872 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Doughton). Later the
President issued an executive order providing that an escape clause similar to that
found in the Mexican Treaty would be included in all future trade agreements. See
Executive Order No. 9832 of Feb. 25, 1947. 3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp. 624.
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The clauses which do not so relate are of three types: (1) those
concerned with administrative matters; 68 (2) those which deal with
import barriers not specifically mentioned in the legislative history,
but similar to barriers expressly mentioned, and thus arguably
within the scope of the general authority to protect the value of
tariff concessions against non-tariff barriers; 69 and (3) two clauses
which except economic development arrangements70 and regional
trading blocks71 from the application of the agreement.
Previous foreign trade agreements. During the 1945 debate, Congress had before it the previous thirty-two trade agreements negotiated under the authority of the Trade Agreements Acts.72 It is
logical to conclude that, as Congress extended the authority to enter
into "foreign trade agreements," it intended to grant authority
which at least encompassed subjects dealt with in prior agreements.
Consequently, it is useful to compare the subject matter of some of
these previous agreements with that of GATT, to see in what
respects, if any, GATT departs from precedent and tradition.73 It
may be noted that the GATT negotiators at Geneva expressed the
view on several occasions that GATT was to take merely the "usual
form of trade agreements," and should include only clauses which
were normally found in such agreements74 and which were essential
to safeguard the value of the tariff concessions negotiated.75
An analysis comparing GATT with certain of these prior agreements is also contained in Appendix A. It shows that almost the
entire range of GATT's substantive subject matter had been dealt
with in one or more prior United States trade agreements, including
the regulation of exports. (The only exceptions to this are films and
export or import-reduction subsidies.) Of course, the GATT administrative provisions are different from those of prior agreements
due to the multilateral nature of GATT, but many of these
68. GATT, arts. XXII-XXXV and specific portions of other articles.
69. See app. A.
70. GATT, art. XVIII.
71. GATT, art. XX.IV.
72. See list of the agreements reproduced in the Hearings on Extension of the
Trade Agreements Act Before the House Comm. on ·ways and Means, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 38, 636, 932 (1948). A list of U.S. agreements with most-favored-nation clauses
appears at p. 837 of these hearings. A full reprint of the agreement with Mexico,
which is representative, may also be found at p. 237.
73. See app. A.
74. Report of the Tariff Negotiation Working Party-General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, U.N. Doc. EPCT/135, para. 6, at 2 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/
TAC/PV.3, at 19 (1947).
75. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment 50 (Oct. 1946); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/ PV.2, at 19
(1947).
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prov1S1ons are simply multilateral parallels to bilateral prov1S1ons
in prior agreements. 76 Given the complexity and comprehensiveness
of United States trade agreements prior to the 1945 Act, and allowing for GATT's multilateral nature, it is hard to conclude that
GATT was a radical or even a substantial departure from the pattern of prior agreements. Arguably, then, the general subjects of
GATT were within the contemplation of Congress when it extended the authority to the President to enter "trade agreements."
This, however, is a conclusion as to the then-existing intent; it may
well be that Congress did not envision the resultant vast extension
of power by the President. Particularly, GATT may have resulted
in an unforeseen extension of executive power, simply because the
same provision may have a greater impact in a multilateral context
than in the context of bilateral relations.
Congressional ratification. The GATT provisions have never
been formally submitted to Congress. The theory of the executive
branch has been that GATT was authorized by a combination of
existing statutes and presidential power, and that therefore there
was no need to submit it to Congress.77 It was intended that the ITO
agreement be submitted to Congress; 78 this would have given Congress a formal opportunity to review provisions many of which are
identically worded in GATT. The ITO was abandoned, however,
so that, while the GATT provisions were extensively discussed in
committee,79 Congress has never formally approved them.
Congress has been acutely aware of GATT over the two decades
of GATT's existence. Each time it extended the Trade Agreements
Act, GATT was debated. 80 In 1955, the Draft Charter for the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC), which was prepared at
GATT meetings and would have set up a formal international
organization to oversee GATT, was submitted to Congress,81 but
76. For an example of administrative provisions in a bilateral trade agreement,
see clauses VI 8: X of the Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands
regarding, inter alia, "sympathetic consideration" and the appointment of a committee
to handle certain disputes. 50 Stat. 1504 (1935).
77. State Department Press Release, Dec. 13, 1945, reprinted in 8 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 970 (1945); Hearings on ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 71 (1947); Hearings on ITO Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1947).
78. Hearings on ITO Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950); Hearings on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed
ITO Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1947).
79. Hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. II42 (1951).
80. See app. D; note 78 supra.
81. H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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Congress did not approve it.82 Arguments for and against the legality of GATT have continued in congressional proceedings at least
up to the end of the 1950's.83
Congressional enactments have mentioned GATT explicitly
only a few times. The first of these was in the 1950 amendment to
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).84 This section
concerns import quotas on agricultural goods, a subject to which
article XI of GATT is intimately related. In 1948, just after GATT
came into being, Congress had amended section 22(£) to read:
No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contravention of any treaty or other international agreement to which the
United States is or hereafter becomes a party.85
In 1950, certain Senators had attempted to reverse this order of
precedence by proposing the following amendment:
No international agreement hereafter shall be entered into by
the United States, or renewed, extended or allowed to extend beyond
its permissible termination date in contravention of this section.so
Instead Congress enacted the following amending language:
No proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contravention of any treaty or other international agreement to which the
United States is or hereafter becomes a party; but no international
agreement or amendment to an existing international agreement
shall hereafter be entered into which does not permit the enforcement of this section with respect to the Articles and countries to
which such agreement or amendment is applicable to the full extent
that the general agreement on tariffs and trade, as heretofore entered
into by the United States, permit such enforcement with respect to
the Articles and countries to which such general agreement is applicable ..•.87
This was the first explicit statutory reference to GATT,88 and, it
may be argued, was express recognition by Congress of the existence
and validity of GATT.
82. A check of the index to 102 CONG. REc. and the CCH CoNG. INDEX for the
84th Congress show that H.R. 5550 never came to a vote. After being reported to the
House in H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), it was given to the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union. No further congressional action was
ever taken.
83. Hearings on Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, IS55 (1958).
84. 64 Stat. 261 (1950).
85. 62 Stat. 1248 (1948).
86. S. REP. No. 1375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950); S. REP. No. 1!126, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1950).
87. 64 Stat. 261 (1950).
88. Based on an extensive search through federal statutes and reading of the
legislative history for the various reciprocal trade agreements acts. See note 91 infra.
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In 1948 and 1949, Congress extended the Trade Agreements Act
for the fifth 89 and sixth00 times. Although neither extension mentioned GATT, it was discussed in the legislative history; thus, arguably, this re-enactment of the statutory authority under which the
President claimed to enter GATT comprises a "ratification" of
GATT.91 The extensions, however, were for one year and two years
respectively, instead of the usual three years, reflecting the uncertainty over foreign economic policy which existed in Congress at
that time. 92 Administration officials testifying before Congress in
1951 refused to raise the ratification argument. 93
The fortunes of politics change, however, and the 82d Congress
had other ideas about GATT. The Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951 provides, in section 10, the second explicit statutory
reference to GATT: 94
The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine
or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
This provision was repeated in the 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1958
extensions of the trade agreements authority. 95 Furthermore, in
1951 Congress amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 by
adding a section which required import quotas on fats, oils, and
certain dairy products in contravention of GATT.96 In addition,
89. 62 Stat. 105!! (1948).
90. 6!! Stat. 697 (1949).
91. This argument is implicit in an affidavit of Williard L. Thorp of the State
Department made before the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia in Rodes v. Acheson, Civil No. 3756-49 (1949):
The justification for discriminations by a country in balance of payments difficulties
under certain circumstances is recoguized by the United States and the 22 other
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (treaties and other
international acts series 1700). The authority to negotiate for the excession of
additional countries to this agreement has recently been extended by Congress
without qualification (public law 307, 81st Congress), following hearings in which
the provisions of the agreement, including those as to discriminations (Article
XIV) were examined in detail (Finance Committee, Senate, extension of reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act hearings, vol. 2, 1250 ff.).
This affidavit was disapprovingly noted by Senator Milliken in Hearings on Extension
of the Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. ll91 (1951).
92. In Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 567 (1957), the Court noted with respect
to the Trade Agreements Act and GATT that, "[t]he constitutionality of the grant
of such authority has been repeatedly questioned in and out of Congress. Nevertheless,
Congress has extended from time to time the period during which the President may
exercise such authority."
93. Hearings on Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Be/ore the Senate Finance
Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1191-92 (1951).
94. 65 Stat. 72 (1951).
95. 72 Stat. 673 (1958); 69 Stat. 162 (1955); 68 Stat. 360 (1954); 67 Stat. 472 (1953).
96. 65 Stat. 1!11, 132 (1951).
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that year Congress once again amended section 22(£) of the AAA,
this time to read:
No trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore
or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be applied in a
manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section.9 7
This was done despite congressional recognition that this might
require the United States to breach GATT,98 and, in fact, forced the
President to obtain a GATT waiver to avoid such a breach.99
These actions illustrated congressional hostility toward GATT,
and caused the Randall Commission on Foreign Economic Policy
to state in 1954:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has never been reviewed and approved by the Congress. Indeed, questions concerning the constitutionality of some aspects of the United States participation in the General Agreement have been raised in the Congress. This has created uncertainty about the future role of the
United States in the General Agreement.100
When the OTC was submitted to Congress in 1956, Congressmen
again complained that they had not had an opportunity to review
GATT, since the Administration carefully avoided submitting it
to them. 101
As a practical matter today, however, GATT is recognized by
Congress as well as the executive branch as an important cornerstone of United States policy. The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,102 makes
very little sense without GATT. The evidence of congressional
ratification of GATT is thus equivocal. Immediately after GATT
came into being Congress seemed to go along, at least until the
ITO was scuttled. Then Congress backpedalled. Yet GATT has
91. 65 Stat. 75 (1951).
98. Congress recognized the possibility that this statutory provision would be
inconsistent with GATT. See S. REP. No. 299, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951); Hearings on
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1951). See also Waiver Granted to the United States in Connec•
tion With Import Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, 3d Supp. BISD 32 (1955).
99. Decision of the Contracting Parties of GATT of March 5, 1955, GATT, !Id
Supp. BISD !12 (1955).
100. COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC PoucY, REPORT ro THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS 49 (1954).
IOI. H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (supplemental views of Honorable
Thomas B. Curtis), 46 (minority views).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964). See Hearings on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1962)
(memorandum on negotiating procedures under GAT'I). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1882
(1964), with GATT, art. XXIII.

December 1967]

GA TT in U.S. Domestic Law

269

been so central to Western foreign economic policies that Congress
has as a practical matter recognized and accepted its existence.
Court opinions. Another factor that reinforces the argument for
the validity of GATT is that it has been recognized by both federal
and state (including territorial) courts. The specific issue of GATT's
validity was raised in only one case, but that case was dismissed on
other grounds. 103 However, a number of other cases have resulted
in decisions necessarily implying the validity of GATT-particularly in tariff cases before the Customs Court and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. 104 In fact, since tariff concessions
embodied in GATT are so extensive, the majority of cases in those
courts now involve tariff rates proclaimed by the President pursuant to GATT or amending protocols. 105 Other than in these
courts, only seven American cases, and three opinions of the California Attorney General,1° 6 have been found which explicitly cite
or mention GATT. 107 Of these, four were in state or territorial
courts108 and three in federal courts.109 In each case GATT's va103. Morgantown Glasswork Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
104. See, e.g., Berent-Vandervoort v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942 (C.C.P.A.
1957); George E. Bardwil &: Sons v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 118 (1955).
105. Examination of any current volume of these courts' reports reveals that the
vast majority of the cases cite a presidential proclamation which effectuates a GATT
agreement. For instance, in vol. 44 only twelve out of fifty-three fully reported
decisions do not cite such a proclamation. See app. C for presidential proclamation
citations for various GATT agreements.
106. The California Attorney General's opinions are 59-164, 34 Cal. A.G. 302;
60-141, 36 Cal. A.G. 147; 62·165, 40 Cal. A.G. 65.
107. The Shepard citators for all states and territories of the United States and
for all federal courts of the United States were searched since 1947 to the most
currently available supplement in June of 1967 for all cases which cite 61 Stat. pts.
5 &: 6, at A 3. Since GATT is sometimes cited without using the "Stat." reference, it is
possible that persons who prepare the citator could have missed some cases if they
did not translate a different citation into the statutory citation. In addition to searching the citators, various attorneys both in and out of government were contacted who
might have knowledge of other cases.
108. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 799 (1962) (California "Buy American Act" held to be unenforceable because
violative of GATT); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165
&: 897591 (Super. Ct., County of Los Angeles 1966) (also challenged the California "Buy
American" Act); Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957) (struck down as unconstitutional
and contrary to GATT a territorial law requiring retailers selling imported eggs to
advertise that fact); Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'r, 364
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) (administrative ruling of the highway commission
requiring the use of domestic steel in highway projects challenged as contrary to
state law, the Constitution, and GATT-disposed of on state law grounds). The
Bethlehem case held that Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton was controlling and that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and therefore denied a petition for a preliminary
injunction. On May 2, 1967, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. The author has
been informed that the case has been appealed. See note 286 infra. See also Comment,
GATT, The California Buy American Act, and the Continuing Struggle Between Free
Trade and Protectionism, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 335 (1964); Note, 17 STAN, L. REv. 119
(1964).
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lidity was either assumed, upheld, or not decided. No opinion citing
or mentioning GATT has yet been rendered by the United States
Supreme Court.
It is appropriate now to turn to the third question as to the
statutory validity of GATT mentioned at the outset of this subsection: whether the administrative provisions110 of GATT constituted it an international organization which the President did
not have the statutory power to join. Most previous United States
trade agreements had provisions in them for certain types of
administrative functions, 111 such as arrangements for consulting112
or agreeing on changes in tariff commitments.113 Early in GATT's
drafting history it was recognized that some of these administrative
functions would be necessary to implement GATT. 114 It was hoped
that the ITO would eventually assume these functions, but until
that time a GATT mechanism was required. 115 Early GATT drafts
consequently provided for an "Interim Trade Committee." 116
Soon after these early drafts, and before negotiations opened at
Geneva in the spring of 1947, House and Senate committees held
extensive hearings on the proposed ITO and GATT negotiations.117
Some members of Congress challenged the authority of the President
to enter into GATT on the specific ground that he was not authorized to join an international "provisional organization." 118 At
subsequent GATT drafting sessions in Geneva, the term "Interim
109. Talbot v. Atlantic Steel, 275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgantown Glassware
Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956); C. Tennant, Sons &: Co. v. Dill,
158 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
110. These provisions are found in GATT, arts. XXII-XXXV. See app. A; text
accompanying note 58 supra.
111. See app. A for illustrative prior trade agreement provisions that correspond
to various articles of GATT.
112. E.g., Article XI of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Canada, 49 Stat. 8960
(1935); art. XIV of the Trade Agreement with Mexico, 57 Stat. 888 (1943).
113. E.g., Article XIV of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Canada, 49 Stat.
3960 (1935).
114. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, annexure 10, § i, at 51 (Oct. 1946).
115. Id.
116. Draft of GATT, arL XX in U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/W.58 (1947); Draft of GATT,
art. XXII in EPCT/C.6/85 (1947); Draft of GATT, art. XXII in Report of the Drafting
Committee on the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment EPCT /34, at 78 (1947).
117. Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the
House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of
the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
118. Hearings on the Operation on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed
ITO Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-95 (1947);
Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 202, 385 (1947).
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Trade Committee" was omitted and instead the term "Contracting
Parties" was used.11 9 The expressed purpose of this change was to
remove any connotation of formal organization.120 The Administration has tried to maintain this fiction that GATT is not an
organization121-going so far, in the 1955 Senate hearings, as to
characterize GATT as merely a "forum."122 Consistently, our contributions to GATT have been drawn from the State Department
"Conferences and Contingency Fund" with the accounting entry
listing GATT as a "provisional organization."123 Furthermore,
GATT has never been designated as an "international organization"
for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Act.124
Despite this fiction, GATT has all the essential characteristics
of an "international organization"-it utilizes a secretariat,125 it
"contracts" with states,126 and it makes decisions which bind mem119. See Draft of GATT, art. XXIII, Joint Action by the Contracting Parties, in
EPCT/135 (1947); Draft of GATT, art. XXIII, Joint Action by the Contracting Parties,
in EPCT/189 (1947); GATT, art. XXV.
120. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/12, at 3 (1947). See also GATT, .ANALYTICAL INDEX
TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS 133 (2d rev. 1966).
121. See Hearings on Extension of the Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1080, 1456-57 (1949).
122. Hearings on H.R. I Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
1254 (1955). In testifying further, however, Secretary Dulles did refer to GATT as an
organization, "where representatives of some thirty-odd countries subscribed to
certain, what you might call, good business principles, and it provides primarily a
forum or a place for carrying on multilateral negotiations ••.•" See also H.R. REP.
No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956).
123. For fiscal year 1967, for example, the United States contribution to GATT
($420,000) is listed on page 764 of the appendix to the budget, and is contained in the
Department of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriation Act for
fiscal year 1967 under the general heading "International Organizations and Conferences," and tbe specific heading "International Conferences and Contingencies."
For previous years, the fiscal year and the page on which the GATT appropriation
can be found are as follows: FY 1966, p. 690-91 of the app.; FY 1965, pp. 628-29 of
the app.; FY 1964, pp. 642-43 of the app.; FY 1963, pp. 608-09 of the app.; FY 1962,
pp. 862-63 of the app.; FY 1961, pp. 788-89 of the app.; FY 1960, pp. 819-20 of the
budget; FY 1959, p. 769 of the budget; FY 1958, p. 872 of the budget; FY 1957, pp.
891-92 of the budget; FY 1956, p. 901 of the budget; FY 1955, p. 874 of the budget;
FY 1954, p. 858 of the budget; FY 1953, p. 907 of the budget; FY 1952, p. 767 of the
budget; FY 1951, p. 985 of the budget. The 1951 fiscal budget appendix shows that
GATT contributions were made as far back as 1949, but prior to the 1951 fiscal year
report the budget item was not broken down to show the contribution to GATT.
124. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1964). Organizations are designated by executive order, and
the 1967 supplement to U.S.C.A. does not list GATT among the organizations so
designated.
125. Technically, GATT does not have a secretariat, but it contracts for such
services from the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization
(I.C.I.T.O.). See Rule 15 of the GATT Rules of Procedure, printed in GATT, 5th
Supp. BISD 11 (1957). This technical distinction is one of form and not substance as
the Secretariat concerned performs functions only for GATT and is generally recognized as the GATT Secretariat. See Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal Aspects of
a Surprising Institution, l J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 n.3 (1967).
126. Article XXXIII of GATT provides that non-member governments may accede
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bers. 127 This latter function is accomplished by the "Contracting
Parties acting jointly," 128 but this seems to be a distinction without
substantive difference. In fact, article XXV of GATT relating to
such joint action is remarkably broad in scope:
I. Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time
to time for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of
this agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with a
view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives
of this agreement. Wherever reference is made in this agreement
to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as
the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
3. Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all
meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
4. Except as otherwise provided for in this agreement, decisions of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority
of the votes cast.

In early years, GATT was very cautious in developing useful
institutions to carry out its work.129 But as the years passed, a series
of committees gradually evolved into an institutional scheme.130
GATT also broadened the scope of its attention and became a
to GATT "on terms to be agreed between such government and the contracting
parties." In practice, when a decision is made by the contracting parties to admit a
new member [e.g., GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 13 (1966)], a protocol with that new
member is opened for signature by all contracting parties. However, the protocol
sometimes states that it will come into effect as soon as the new member signs it,
which suggests that it is in essence a contract between the GATT contracting parties
acting jointly, and the new member nation. See, e.g., protocol for the recession of
Switzerland, GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 6 (1966). In addition, GATT has, through its
I.C.I.T.O. Secretariat (see note 125 supra), made contractual arrangements with the
host country (Switzerland) for loans for construction of headquarter space, and
pursuant to art. XV entered into "Special Exchange Agreements" with several
countries.
127. Although executive branch officials of the United States try to play down
this aspect of GATT [e.g., Secretary Dulles in the Hearings on Extension of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1239-67 (1955)], art. XXV certainly contemplates actions which must be
considered to be "binding" as an international obligation on contracting parties. The
principal such action is a waiver.
128. GATT, art. XXV.
129. See Report adopted by the Contracting Parties on December 16, 1950, GATT
Doc. CP.5/49, reprinted in GATT, 2 BISD 194 (1952); discussions at the fifth session
of the Contracting Parties to GATT concerning intercessional arrangements for
continuing administration, GATT Docs. CP.5/SR 17, SR 18, &: SR 25 (1950).
130. The Council is perhaps the most significant of the GATT institutions and one
of the most interesting in development. See GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 7 (1961). Other
GATT standing committees include the Balance of Payments Committee, 7th Supp.
BISD IO (1959), and the Trade and Development Committee, 13th Supp. BISD 75
(1965).
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policy-making body for a wide variety of subjects touching on international economics and trade.131 Is or was this aspect of GATT
authorized? The administrative clauses of previous bilateral trade
agreements furnish precedent and legislative history to show such
authorization.132 Additionally, authority to enter "trade agreements"
arguably implies authority to agree to necessary administrative
provisions.133 Finally, it should be remembered that presidential
powers may be the source of the requisite authority. 134
Even conceding that the President was authorized to join GATT
as it was constituted at its outset, it can be argued that there is no
such authorization to adhere to the institution into which GATT
has evolved. This is a difficult argument, however, and illustrates
the problem of "static legalisms" in a dynamic world. The very
practice which GATT developed, step by step, in a sense furnishes
its own precedent. Gradually, acceptance of changes in a viable
institution lead after some years to acceptance of an institution
radically different than its origins would have suggested. GATT is
not the first such phenomenon-it does, however, warrant special
interest since it occurred in the international arena and has constitutional implications.
Thus, in answer to the question whether the President had
statutory authority to enter GATT, it seems clear that he did. The
wording of the statute, legislative history, and the known precedents
of prior trade agreements at the time of the 1945 Act combine to
show a delegation of authority to enter into all particular portions
of GATT, subject to "existing legislation" under the Protocol of
llll. See GATT, GAIT: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, HOW IT WORKS (1966). Current
GATT activities include administering the General Agreement itself, sponsoring tariff
negotiations such as those in the Kennedy Round, undertaking studies of economic
problems of less developed countries [e.g., Report of the Working Party of Economic
Problems of Chad, GATT Doc. COM.TD/44 (1967)], and preparing studies of various
aspects of international trade (e.g., the so-called Haberler Report, Trends in International Trade, GATT Sales No. GATT/1958-3; Restrictive Business Practices, GATT
Sales No. GATT/1959/-2).
1!12. Examples of administrative provisions in previous bilateral trade agreements
can be seen from the chart in app. A, provisions that correspond to arts. XXII-XX.XV
of GATT. The fact that these trade agreements were known to Congress supports
the argument that Congress contemplated such administrative provisions in the trade
agreements which it was authorizing.
13!1. This argument was made in congressional hearings: Hearings on Extension
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1282 (1949); Hearings on Extending Authority To Negotiate Trade Agreements
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 469, 471 (1948).
134. The State Department has, in part, relied upon this source. See H.R. REP. No.
2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956); Hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1153 (1951); Hearings on Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051 (1949), partially reproduced in app. B.

274

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:249

Provisional Application, with the possible exception of some of the
"administrative" clauses of GATT. Even agreement to these provisions can be justified as implicit in the basic authority to enter trade
agreements, and as being merely multilateral applications of clauses
and principles previously established in the bilateral context.
Nevertheless, the development of GATT has brought with it
some important policy questions. Even assuming that GATT is
valid as a matter of United States domestic law, it is clear that the
circumstances of its history have resulted in a considerable shift of
power ~o the executive branch without the statutory framework
which defines executive-legislative relations in connection with our
participation in other international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, and the United Nations.135 Lack of meaningful
congressional participation in foreign affairs is a problem not
unique to the economic sphere.136 Nevertheless, the regular renewal
of the trade agreements acts137 does provide one opportunity for
congressional review of trade policy, and informal and formal
participation of Congressmen at GATT negotiations provides other
opportunities.138 Whether or not this limited role relegated to the
Congress in economic policy-making through GATT is adequate,
either from a policy or constitutional standpoint, may yet be legitimately questioned.

2. Constitutional Powers of the President
The executive branch, in justifying our adherence to GATT,
has usually relied, at least in part, upon the constitutional powers
of the President to conduct foreign affairs.139 A State Department
memorandum, submitted during the 1949 Senate committee hearings on the Trade Agreements Act, noted precedents for presidential
agreements relating to foreign commerce.140 This memorandum
135. See, e.g., United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1964); Bretton
Woods Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1964).
136. E.g., Senator Fulbright's remarks reported in Kenworthy, Fulbright Sees Senate
Influencing Policy Again, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1967, at 5, col. I.
137. See app. D.
138. Congressmen have participated informally in major GATT negotiations since
the mid-1950's. This practice was formalized in the Kennedy Round. See Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, § 243, 19 u.s.c. § 1873 (1964); 111 CONG, REc. 12348 (1965).
The delegation included: Rep. Thomas B. Curtis, Rep. Cecil King, Sen. John Williams,
Sen. Herman Talmadge, and alternates Sen. Frank Carlson and Sen. Abraham Ribicoff.
For reports on these negotiations see 113 CONG. REc. 3819, 4128, 4891 (1967).
139. See app. B.
140. Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051-55 (1949).
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further specified the sources of authority for this country's agreement to each article of GATT, relying in a number of places,
particularly as to the administrative provisions, on the President's
constitutional authority. Arguments based on president authority
are, however, weakened by a federal court of appeals case141 which
held that the President overstepped his delegated powers when he
entered into an agreement with Canada which regulated trade. The
court's statement on this issue was unmistakable:
The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not
the executive or the courts; and the executive may not exercise the
power by entering into executive agreements and suing in the
courts ....142
The earlier discussion concerning statutory authority, however,
demonstrates that it is probably unnecessary to rely upon independent presidential authority for GATT, but to be able to do so
would reinforce the basic proposition that United States participation in GATT is valid.

3. Later GA TT Agreements
Heretofore, for purposes of clarity and simplicity, I have spoken
of GATT largely as if it were a single agreement coming into force
at one point of time. This is not the case-in fact, over I 00 international agreements (listed in Appendix C), some not yet in force,
can officially be termed "GATT agreements." 143 In order completely
to present the picture of GATT in United States domestic law, it
would be necessary to analyze many of these later agreements with
respect to the President's power to enter into them. This would,
of course, be unduly cumbersome, and for that reason, will not
be attempted. However, some generalizations can be made.
In the first place, from I 945 down to the present except for
several short gaps, there has been a statute in force with basic
authorizing language similar to that of the 1945 Trade Agreements
Extension Act. 144 Consequently, the analysis of the statutory lan141. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954).
142. 204 F.2d at 658.
143. The definition of an "official" GATT agreement must be somewhat arbitrary,
but it is convenient to include all those GATT agreements which were deposited with
the United Nations prior to 1955 [and listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3/Rev. 1 (1963)),
and all those which have been deposited with the Executive Secretary of GATT
since 1955 [and listed in Status of Multilateral Protocols of Which the Executive
Secretary Acts as Depository, GATT Doc. PROT/2/Rev. 2 (1966) or in more recent
CATT documents].
144. Appendix D contains a chart of each of these statutes with their respective
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guage of the 1945 Act as a source of presidential authority will
apply to these amendments and protocols, subject to some different
limiting clauses in the subsequent acts.H 5 Second, all such protocols
and agreements which affect the general language of GATT, except
for the later agreement adding Part IV and certain recent agreements resulting from the Kennedy Round (which I shall discuss
below), have concerned subject matter sufficiently close to the
original GATT that the conclusions based on legislative history
and other arguments as to the scope of authority under the 1945
Act should be applicable in the case of these later protocols.Ho
(This is especially so when it is remembered that Part II, the
"safeguarding provisions," is subject to "existing legislation.")147
Third, some of these subsequent protocols and agreements could
as well be based on presidential power alone.148 For example, protocols of rectification are arguably within the executive's implicit
power to continue to administer prior agreements.149
At the close of the Kennedy Round negotiations on June 30,
1967, a series of protocols and agreements were completed, 150 four
of which related to accession of new members,151 while four others
embodied other results of the negotiations.152 Two of these latter
time spans. In each statute, there is authority to "enter into foreign trade agreements"
and to "proclaim such modifications" subject to certain limitations. See note 29 supra.
145. These limiting clauses related primarily to the allowable percentage cuts in
tariff rates and, in some of the statutes, to certain other negotiating limits (e.g., peril
point or escape clauses). No instance of violation of negotiating limits has been found
by this writer, but the subject is vast and technical since tens of thousands of items
are involved. See note 56 supra. This author has been told that some specific minor
portions of the proclamations for the original GATT agreement arguably exceed some
of these limits.
146. This is the judgment of the author. To analyze each clause of each amendment and protocol in detail would be too cumbersome to include in this article.
Nevertheless, the reader can see from the chart of amendments and protocols in app.
C the general nature of those amendments and protocols.
147. The general practice within GATT has been to assume that protocols amending Pt. II are subject to the Protocol of Provisional Application by which GATT was
originally applied. One could argue that the subsequent protocols and amendments
stand upon their own feet and thus circumvent the Protocol of Provisional Application. A more appropriate analysis seems to be that technically the subsequent protocols
or amendments are amendments to the Protocol of Provisional Application, which
in tum incorporates by reference the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade including the amending article, which article provides the authority for amending the
Protocol of Provisional Application.
148. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.2.
149. These protocols merely correct mistakes in prior protocols. See app. C.
150. Final Act Authenticating the Results of the 1964-67 Trade Conference held
under the Auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, GATT Doc. L/2813 (1967).
151. Argentina, Iceland, Ireland, and Poland. See app. C.
152. Geneva (1967) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
Agreement relating principally to Chemicals, supplementary to the Geneva (1967)
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agreements are admittedly not authorized by the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, which is the current trade agreements legislation. Of
these two, the Administration will probably ask Congress to pass
legislation authorizing one, but argues that it has authority to carry
out the other under existing statutes.153
There is one problem as to these and other GATT amendments,
however, that is not only potentially troublesome in the GATT
context but could come up in relation to other international agreements. This problem is posed by the inclusion of a power to amend
in the agreement itself. Even if a procedure for adopting future
amendments (article XXX in GATT) were built into the original
agreement, a question exists as to the scope of the President's power
to agree to new amendments. It was argued above that the amending clause of GATT, like the other administrative provisions can
be justified as within the congressional delegation of power either
as a necessary and implicit concomitant to the trade agreement
power, or by analogy to prior bilateral trade agreement provisions
known to Congress. 154 But as worded in GATT article XXX, there
are no subject matter limits at all to this amending power.155 Can
the President then argue that since Congress delegated to him the
power to agree to amend GATT, that any amendment he now
desires to agree to is authorized by that congressional delegation?
This bootstrap argument must be answered in the negative. If the
amending clause were indeed that broad, it can simply be argued
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Memorandum of Agreement
on Basic Elements for the Negotiation of a W'orld Grains Arrangement; Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
See app. C.
153. The Chemicals Agreement, note 152 supra, provides that the United States
will eliminate the "American Selling Price" method of valuing certain goods (primarily
Benzenoid chemicals) which is contrary to GATT art. VII but was "existing legislation" in 1947 when GATT was signed and therefore not contrary to GATT as
applied by the Protocol of Provisional Application. The Administration will likely ask
Congress to accept the ASP changes, but argues that it can implement the antidumping provisions under art. VI of GATT without further legislative authority.
See discussion in text at pt. III.B.2; note 153 supra. See also Dale, Jr., Details Emerge
on Tariff Accord, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1967, at 29, col. 1; Lawrence, Single Trade Bill in
'67 Seen Liltely, J. Commerce, July 12, 1967, at 1, col. l; GATT Doc. L/2375/Add. l at
17 (1965).
154. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.I.
155. GATT, art. XXX reads:
1. Except where provisions for modification is made elsewhere in this Agreement
amendments to the provisions of Part I of this Agreement or to the provisions
of Article XXIX or of this Article shall become effective upon acceptance by all
the contracting parties, and other amendments to this agreement shall become
effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties and thereafter for each other
contracting party upon acceptance by it.
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that it was not originally authorized and so is itself ultra vires. A
better approach, however, would be to assume that the amending
power itself is valid, but then to construe the President's authority
to agree to amendments as limited in the same way as his power
to enter into a trade agreement independent of the amending
clause of GATT. 156 In this connection, it is interesting to note that
both the Bretton-Woods Agreements Act157-which governs our
participation in the International Monetary Fund and in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-and the
United Nations Participation Act158 impose explicit limits on the
presidential power to agree to amendments to the relevant international agreements. An argument could be made in favor of congressional action to regularize United States participation in GATT
on the pragmatic ground that such an act would afford an opportunity to spell out explicitly the limits on the power of the
executive to agree to amendments of GATT, thus obtaining greater
congressional participation in any future major shift in GATT
policy.159
The "Part IV amendments" to GATT, entitled "Trade and
Development,"160 require separate analysis. These consist of three
articles which detail matters relating to the use of trade to promote the economic development of less developed countries. The
articles "commit" those members who are deemed developed
countries to "accord high priority to the reduction . . . of barriers
156. There is at this point another argument which could give some trouble,
namely, that since the amending article was agreed to under the 1945 Statute, that
that Statute gives the scope and limitation to the amending article for all future
time. Following this analysis, later statutes of the United States which amend the
Trade Agreements Act could not expand or contract the authority to amend art.
XXX of GATT. This argument must be rejected, however, since not only is it
impractical and unduly rigid, but the intent of Congress in delegating authority to
enter into an agreement with an amending provision must have been that the amending provision wonld take on the scope of authority of future congressional acts • .Alternatively, it can be argued that each subsequent statutory amendment is an authorization to the executive branch to continue to participate in GATT and the amending
authority would take on the scope and extent of the then current statutory authority
of the Executive.
157. 22 u.s.c. § 286 (1964).
158. 22 u.s.c. § 287 (1964).
159. The arguments contained in this subsection concerning art. XXX apply also
to the authority contained for joint action under art. XXV, including the authority
to grant a waiver, and possibly certain other "joint action" provisions. Of course, for
Congress to impose a tight rein on the President in connection with joint action of
the contracting parties would be a mistake, since a certain amount of flexibility is
essential. Congress might appropriately require specific reports of United States' votes
at GATT meetings, however, so that the interested Congressional committee could
have an opportunity to appraise the executive branch activities on a continuing basis.
160. The text of pt. IV of GATT can be found in GATT Doc. IPRO/65-1
(1965) and in 51 U.S. STATE DEP'T Bou. 922 (1964).
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to products . . . of . . . export interest to less-developed contracting
parties ... ," to refrain from fiscal measures that would hamper
imports from less-developed countries, and to "make every effort,"
"give active consideration," and "have special regard" for certain
similar policies that affect the economic development of less developed countries. The commitments are qualified by exceptions for
"compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons."
Part IV was completed February 8, 1965, and signed on that day
by a number of nations. Some countries also agreed to apply Part
IV de facto pending its entry into force on June 27, 1966.161 At
this time, the statutory authority for the United States to enter
trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which contained the standard language already discussed,1 62 authorizing "entry
into trade agreements" and proclamation of duty modifications.
Can the President's acceptance of Part IV be justified on the
authority of this Statute? Two arguments can be made. First, we can
reiterate the argument that separates the first clause from the limitations of the second clause and thereby authorizes any "trade agreement."163 Part IV deals with trade and so is arguably authorized.
Second, insofar as Part IV clauses relate to other GATT clauses, all
the arguments made for the validity of GATT in 1947 apply to urge
the validity of Part IV.164 However, Part IV is a most radical
departure from prior GATT language. True, the "old GATT"
included article XVIII which contains elaborate provisions regarding economic development of less developed countries. But
these provisions are exceptions to, or escapes from, the other GATT
commitments. No additional obligations, other than to consult and
report, are imposed by article XVIII. Part IV, on the other hand,
commits developed countries to "refrain from introducing" barriers
on products from less developed countries (whether subject to
tariff schedule concessions in GATT or not),1 611 to refrain from new
fiscal measures that would hamper exports from these countries,166
161. GATI' Doc. IPRO/65-1 (1965). See also, GATI' Press Release 962 Gune 28,
1966).
162. 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (1964):
(1) after June 30, 1962, and before July I, 1967, enter into trade agreements with
foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) proclaim such modification on continuance of any existing duty on other
import restrictions such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment,
or such additional import restrictions, as he determines to be required or
appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.
163. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
164. See discussion in text at pt. II.A.I. and app. A.
165. GATI', art. XXXVII, para. l(b).
166. GATI', art. XXXVII, para. l(c).
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and so forth. It further provides that GATT shall establish institutional arrangements to accomplish the purposes of Part IV. 167 These
commitments have purposes which arguably go beyond anything
contemplated by the Trade Agreements Act of 1945.168 Does the
1945 statutory language re-enacted in 1962 have a new and expanded
meaning? There is some basis for the argument that it does. 169 However, the failure of Congress to approve the OTC in 1956 argues
against an expanding interpretation of the trade agreements authority.170 Consequently, to justify United States entry into the Part
IV amendments, it may be necessary for the President to rely on his
executive powers. Since the commitments in Part IV are carefully
hedged and expressly subject to contrary "compelling reasons, which
may include legal reasons,'' 171 it is possible to argue that Part IV
entry was within the presidential power even without statutory
authority. I£ anything, the entry into Part IV demonstrates the
anomaly of United States participation in GATT without a statutory framework for congressional participation, and shows to what
extent foreign commerce matters have come under the control of
the executive branch of the government.
B. Is GATT "Law" in the United States'!

A question separate from the validity of GATT as an international agreement of the United States is the "domestic law" effect
of GATT within this country. To put it another way, the United
States may have validly entered GATT, but it may only obligate
the United States internationally, without being directly applicable
in domestic courts or proceedings. In this section will be examined
the general question of whether GATT has a domestic law effect
in the United States, leaving for Part III the discussion of the extent
and nature of that effect, if it does exist.
First, some general propositions about international agreements
under constitutional law must be reviewed. The reader will recall
167. GATT, art. XXXVIII, paras. I & 2(f).
168. Article XX.XVI, para. 2, for instance, states as a principle objective the "need
for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less developed
contracting parties."
169. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 contains some recognition of the problems
of less developed countries by providing for the possibility of free entry of tropical,
agricultural, and forestry commodities. See 19 U.S.C. § 1833 (1964). An early proposed
version of this statute listed as one purpose, "to assist in the progress of countries in
the earlier stages of economic development." H.R. REP. No, 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1962). This was omitted at a later stage.
170. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
171. GATT, art. XXXVII, para. I.
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the established rule that treaties, submitted only to the Senate, can
be domestic law just as if the treaty were enacted by both houses
as legislation.172 This is true, so the doctrine goes, if the treaty is
"self-executing," which, in turn, is ascertained by examining the
language of the treaty ("does it give direct rights to a litigant?") and
the intent of its draftsmen.173 This rule contrasts with the law of
many nations, particularly the Commonwealth and Scandinavian
countries, where no international treaty or agreement has a domestic
law effect. 174 The doctrine for "treaties" also applies to executive
agreements, both those entered pursuant to an act of Congress and
those entered pursuant to the President's powers,175 as the wellknown Belmont116 and Pink 177 cases illustrate.
These propositions seem simple enough, and there is an extensive literature concerning them, 178 but the application of these
rules can be very difficult, and specific situations give rise to analytical difficulties that lurk behind the generalities.

I. An Agreement Authorized by Congress
Examination of the domestic law effect of GATT in this country
must begin with the Trade Agreements Act as it existed in 1945.
Once again we meet the interesting bifurcated power delegation to
the President:
(I) To enter into foreign trade agreements ...
(2) To proclaim such modification of existing duties and other
import restrictions ... [etc.,] ... as are required or appropriate
to carry out any foreign trade agreement ....119
This language seems to indicate that only clause (2) authorizes a
domestic law effect. To express it another way, this Statute appears
172. Vv. BISHOP, GENERAL COURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1965, 201 in 2
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REcUEJL DES CouRS (1965); E. BYRD, TREATIES AND
ExECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 5 (1960); RF.5TATEMENT § 141.
173. W. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1965, 201 in 2
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, R.EcUEJL DES COURS (1965); RESTATEMENT § 141
(comment and illustrations).
174. w. BISHOP, GENERAL CoURSE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1965, 201 in 2
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REcuEIL DES COURS (1965); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1966); Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the
European Commission of Human Rights: A Second Look, 7 J. OF THE INT'L COMMISSION
OF Juius-rs 55 (1966) (the author discusses the domestic law effect of treaties in a
synoptic fashion for a number of European countries in relation to the European
Convention of Human Rights).
175. RESTATEMENT §§ 142, 143, &: 144.
176. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Of course, the extent of that
domestic effect may differ.
177. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
178. See notes 172-74 supra.
179. See note 29 supra for the full text of § 350.
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to distinguish the authority to obligate the United States internationally in clause (1) from the authority to make domestic law
in clause (2). 180 On this view, then, only the President's proclamation and not the trade agreement, as such, has a domestic law effect.
This hypothesis will now be tested by examining the statutory
language, the legislative history of the Statute, the GATT language
and preparatory work, judicial decisions, and the presidential
practice regarding proclamations.
The statutory language. The bifurcated power delegation noted
above does not necessarily lead to the conclusion stated by the
hypothesis. One can argue that the word "proclaim" refers simply
to a convenient symbolic act, a mere "announcement," in order that
the public can take cognizance of the international agreement. 181
The notes to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
provide some support for this view by indicating that "[e]xecutive
[a]greements are not usually proclaimed by the President unless
they modify tariff schedules."182 Also, sometimes an international
agreement will itself provide that it becomes effective upon "proclamation,"183 simply because this is a convenient act to use as the
"starting gun." Furthermore, the executive branch might be hesitant
to accept the proposition that the domestic law effect of trade agreements stems only from the "proclaiming power," since, as argued
above, the "trade agreements" power might well be broader than the
power to proclaim.
The word "proclaim" is an interesting one in United States law,
and seems to defy precise or narrow definition. A perusal of presidential proclamations184 demonstrates that most are used to establish
180. See State Department memorandum printed in H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1956).
181. For instance, art. XV of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between the United
States and Canada, 49 Stat. 3960 (1935) states:
The present agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States
of America and shall be ratified by His Majesty the King of Great Britain ••• in
respect of the Dominion of Canada.
The entire agreement shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the
proclamation and ratification at Ottawa.
182. REsTATEMENT § 131 (Reporter's note). The Reporter's note to § 130 concerning
treaties notes the use by the President of a proclamation to establish the entry into
effect of a treaty.
183. See note 181 supra.
184. Many presidential proclamations are printed in the Federal Register and the
Code of Federal Regulations as well as in the weekly compilation of Presidential
Documents. The Proclamations are gathered each year in the United States Code and
Congressional Service. See 1 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.6 (1966) as to the preparation of presidential
proclamations and executive orders, excluding those proclaiming treaties or international agreements.
In Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'n, 364 S.W.2d 749, 750
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), the Texas court used the term "proclamation" in connection
with state laws and regulations as follows: Articles 6665 and 6666 provide for the
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ceremonial days, or weeks, and holidays. But a sprinkling of other
types exist. 185 Proclamations have in the past, for instance, been
used to establish the legal effect of statehood for new states.186 The
language of the particular Statute involved here seems to use the
word "proclaim" in a more significant sense than a mere signal, and
the legislative history bears this out.
Legislative history. The language of the Statute, including the
bifurcated power approach, was probably chosen for the original
1934 Act more as a result of tradition and precedent than for any
calculated purpose. As early as 1798, an act empowered the President
to undertake commercial intercourse with a foreign country (France)
and "to make proclamation thereof." 187 This terminology was
followed in a series of other international trade statutes during
the ensuing century. The 1897 Tariff Act, for example, gave the
President power to enter into "commercial agreements" with foreign
governments, and separately to suspend duties on products subject
to the agreement "by proclamation to that effect." 188 The Supreme
Court, in passing on the constitutionality of the delegation of power
to the President under the Tariff Act of 1890, held that no "legislative power" was delegated because the President could only issue
a proclamation based on particular findings of fact specified in the
Statute.180 Later tariff statutes reinforced this practice of establishing a proclamation power as the normal means for the President
to implement tariff changes.190
The 1934 legislative history does indicate, however, that the two
powers delegated in the Statute were considered separate and distinct. Both the Senate Finance Committee and the executive branch
organization of the Commission and for the establishment and public proclamation of
all rules and regulations • • • ." This usage suggests that proclamation can be used
almost synonymously with "issuing a regulation."
185. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 3754, 3 C.F.R. 1966 Comp. 90 (effectuating the Florence Agreement on importation of educational, scientific, and cultural
materials); Presidential Proclamation No. 3681, 3 C.F.R. 1964-1965 Comp. 139 (giving
Australian Military Courts jurisdiction over offenses committed in the United States
by .Australian servicemen).
186. Enabling acts set forth the conditions which the state must meet to be admitted and, when those conditions were met, authorize the President to proclaim
statehood. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 139, 18 Stat. 474 (Colorado); Act of
June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (Oklahoma). See also J. SAX, WATER LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 355, 355 n.25 (1965).
187. Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565, 566. See Hearings on the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82
(1934).
188. Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203.
189. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681 (1892).
190. See Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-95 (1934).

284

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:249

witnesses in the 1934 hearings appear to have recognized this separation, relying on the case of Field v. Glark 191 to establish that neither
delegation was unconstitutional. 192 The 1934 House Report also
stated:
Former enactments have delegated to the President the power to
fix tariff rates and have also delegated to the President the power
to enter into executive agreements concerning tariff rates.1 9 3
The Report went on to note that these enactments had not been
held unconstitutional by the courts.
The distinction was perhaps even more forcefully presented by
Senator George speaking for the 1934 Act on the floor of the Senate.
Although certain of his premises were either overbroad or need
modification in the light of Belmont and Pink, his statement is
certainly significant evidence of congressional intent:
The well-recognized distinction between an executive agreement
and a treaty is that the former cannot alter the existing law and
must conform to all prior statutory enactments, whereas a treaty,
if ratified by and with the advise and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate itself becomes the supreme law of the land and takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
If the contemplated agreements to be effective should require
Senate's ratification, there would be no need for the proposed legislation, inasmuch as the President would then simply negotiate a
treaty which, if ratified by the Senate, would itself have the effect
of changing the tariff rates. However, in the present bill, the Congress proposes to change the prevailing tariff law so that the proposed
executive agreements may be made in harmony with the revised
law. This is a fundamental distinction and answers the question as
to why the bill is here. A mere executive agreement can be made by
the President without the consent of Congress. It is equally trueand the fact demonstrates beyond all question the real nature of
the agreements-that the agreements contemplated in the present
bill could not be made effective by the President without prior
Congressional authorization.104
The Senate and House Reports at the time of the Act's extension in 1943 reinforce this position. The Senate Report, for
instance, stated:
Under the Trade Agreements Act changes in our tariff rates are
made, so far as our domestic law is concerned, by the President's
proclamation under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act.
191. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
192. See Hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 60 (1934).
193. H.R. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
194. 78 CONG. REC. 10072 (1934).
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Changes in the Tariff rates are not made by the agreements,
per se ....
It is precisely the same procedural principle as that on which the
Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by Congress to fix
fair and reasonable railroad rates.1 95

The congressional meaning of "proclaim" in the trade agreements context, then, is not the simple ceremonial signal involved
in a Thanksgiving Day proclamation, but rather is the means by
which bargains struck with foreign trading nations are carried into
law at home by the President.
GA TT language and preparatory work. Even if, contrary to the
view propounded above, the President was delegated the authority
under the Act to enter a self-executing trade agreement, if he did
not choose to enter this type of agreement (and the language of the
agreement reflects this choice), then it would not be domestic law
per se. 196 An examination of the 1947 trade agreement and its
preparatory work is thus in order to ascertain if that agreement
purported to be self-executing or non-self-executing. It can be
argued that the latter is the better interpretation, although the
evidence is at least equivocal.
Many clauses of GATT read as though they were meant to be
directly applicable as domestic law. 197 Moreover, several of these
clauses were dravm from those portions of the ITO Draft Charter198
which were intended to be applied in a self-executing manner. 199
However, it will be remembered that GATT itself has never tech195. S. REP. No. 258, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 48 (1943).
196. REsTATEMENT § 143 (comment).
197. For instance, para. 3 of art. VI of GATT begins: "No contravailing duty shall
be levied on any product of the territory of another contracting party in excess
of ••••"
198. The general provisions of GATT are drawn mostly from what became ch. IV
("Commercial Policy'') of the charter for the ITO. See Final Act, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, (1947-1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICIT0/1/4
(1948). In previous drafts of the ITO Charter this chapter was ch. V. See U.N. Doc.
EPCT/34 (1947). The draft of GATT contained in U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 65 (1947)
includes notes relating the GATT articles to articles in the then ITO Charter draft.
GATT, .ANALYTICAL INDEX TO TIIE GENERAL AGREEMENT {2d rev. 1966) also gives corresponding numbers of the Havana Charter to the related GATT article.
199. At the London meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, Harry Hawkins, representing the United
States, said:
This Charter would deal with the subjects which the Preparatory Committee has
assigned to its five working committees. It should deal with these subjects in
precise detail so that the obligations of member governments would be clear and
unambiguous. Most of these subjects readily lend themselves to such treatment.
Provisions on such subjects, once agreed upon, would be self-executing and could
be applied by the governments concerned without further elaboration or international action.
U.N. Doc. EPCT/CJ.I/PV2, at 8 (1946).
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nically come into force: 200 it is applied by the United States and
other original parties only by virtue of the Protocol of Provisional
Application. The language of this Protocol is that of commitment
to apply GATT, not language of immediate application.201 Moreover, there are other indications that the draftsmen of the Protocol did not intend a self-executing effect.202 For example, at one
point the American delegate spoke as follows:
[P]rovided there is simultaneous publication and entry into force
of the document, there would be no objection if there were differences in the actual time at which they were put provisionally
into force, provided there was a date before which that must be
done •...203

Since by definition a self-executing agreement requires no further
steps to be put into force, this language is evidence of a non-selfexecuting intent.
Court application. Once again the American court treatment of
GATT can be discussed in two parts. The Customs Court and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals uniformly refer to GATT
by citing the relevant Presidential Proclamation as reprinted in the
Treasury Decision series.204 In these courts, then, at least in tariff
matters, it can be assumed that it is the proclamation which is the
"law," not the executive agreement.
200. See introduction to pt. II of the text.
201. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950):
The Government of ••• [eight named nations including the United States] •••
undertake, provided that this Protocol shall have been signed on behalf of all
the foregoing Governments not later than November 15, 1947, to apply provisionally on and after January 1, 1948:
(a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and
(b) Part II of that agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with the
existing legislation.
2. The foregoing government shall make effective such provisional application
of the General Agreement, in respect of any of their territories other than their
metropolitan territories, on or after January 1, 1948, upon the expiration of 30
days from the day on which notice of such application is received by the Secre•
tary-General of the United Nations.
3. Any other government signatory to this protocol shall make effective such
provisional application of the General Agreement, on or after January 1, 1948,
upon the expiration of 30 days from the day of signature of this protocol on
behalf of such government.
(Emphasis added.) Compare the discussion of self-executing treaties in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CAsES AND MATERIAIS 146-49 (2d ed. 1962). In particular, the case
of Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929) which, in holding a
treaty provision non-self-executing, noted that the language of the statute provided
that a patent period "extension shall be made, not by the instrument itself, but by
each of the high contracting parties.''
202. See U.N. Doc. F.PCT/TAC/PV.4 at 15, 19, 22 (1947).
203. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV.4 at 22 (1947).
204. See note 105 supra. Although the chances are that at least some Customs Court
or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals opinions fail to cite the proclamation reference when relying on GATT, no such opinion has been found and it is clear that the
usual practice is to cite the Treasury Decision which incorporates the proclamation.
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In other courts, usage is less clear. Apparently, only three federal
court cases have cited GATT. 205 Although the courts in these cases
mentioned GATT only by its name, or by the Statutes at Large
reference206 (which does not contain the proclamation), the issues
were such that GATT was not directly applied. In the only four
state and teritorial court decisions which mention GATT, the situation differs. One of these was decided without ruling on the legal
effect of GATT, 207 but the other three purported to rely, at least in
part, directly on GATT. 208 In each of these latter cases GATT was
treated as a "treaty," and applied as law without citing its proclamation,209 although one court mentioned generally that such
agreements were proclaimed.210 In three California Attorney General's opinions that involve GATT,211 there was also no mention of
the proclamation.
Yet in each of these seven cases and opinions, the provision of
GATT involved was one which had in fact been proclaimed.212 So
the distinction between the court's approach and that being pro205. See note 109 supra.
206. Morgantown Glassware Guild, Inc. v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
simply mentions "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1947." Talbot v.
Atlantic Steel Co., 275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960) also merely uses the title of the agreement. C. Tennant, Sons &: Co. v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), refers to
"General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, commonly known as GATT, 61 Stat.,
Part 5, pp. A3, A7 et seq."
207. Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers v. Texas Highway Comm'n, 364 S.W.2d 749
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
208. Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1967); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Co. v. Superior
Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1962); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board
of Comm'rs, Civil No. 899165, 897591 (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966).
209. For an example of this sort of judicial treatment of GATT when applied as
law, see Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 568 (1967):
This case poses the question: Is an executive agreement, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty within the meaning of this constitutional provision, [the supremacy clause of Article VI, Section 2] so that it has the
same efficacy as a treaty made by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate? We think it is, under the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in United States v. Belmont • • • and United States v.
Pink ••••
210. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 820, 25
Cal. Rptr. 799, 820 (1962).
211. See note 106 supra.
212. The Ho case invoked art. m, paras. I &: 4, and art. XX of GATT. These
provisions were proclaimed in the United States by Presidential Proclamation No.
2761A (3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp. 139) and subsequent amendments to these provisions were also proclaimed by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 2790 (3 C.F.R.
1943-1948 Comp. 204), 3513 (3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 246) and 2829 (3 C.F.R. 19491953 Comp. 7). See app. C. The Baldwin-Lima case invoked art. III, paras. 2 &: 5 of
GATT which were proclaimed by Presidential Proclamation No. 2761A (3 C.F.R.
1943-1948 Comp. 139) and subsequently amended by Presidential Proclamation No.
2829 (3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 7). The Bethlehem Steel case relied on BaldwinLima and, insofar as it depended upon GATT, involved the same articles. See note
286 supra.
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pounded in this article would not have led to a difference in result
in the cases that have so far arisen. The careful attorney must,
however, beware of possible pitfalls in the distinction between a
trade agreement proclaimed and one unproclaimed, particularly
as to those portions of GATT, or agreements concerning GATT
obligations, which have not been proclaimed.
The presidential practice of proclamation. Appendix. C contains
a detailed analysis of the GATT agreements and protocols, including whether or not each has been proclaimed in whole or in
part. This chart reveals an apparently bewildering diversity of
treatment. Up to the time of this writing, there have been over one
hundred international agreements of various labels which have been
opened for signature to GATT contracting parties, and deposited
either at the United Nations (up to 1955) or at GATT headquarters (after 1955). About four-fifths of these have come into
force. The United States has signed most of the GATT agreements,
and proclaimed a large number of those signed but some which it
signed and which are in force have not been proclaimed, whereas
some which it signed but which are not yet in force have been
proclaimed.213
Despite the apparent diversity of treatment, however, there is a
discernible pattern in the proclamation practice. First, whenever
a United States tariff rate is changed by an agreement, it has been
proclaimed.214 At times, for convenience, the proclamation may
precede the effective date of the agreement, in which case the proclamation specifies the condition subsequent which effectuates the
changes.1n 15 Second, a number of GATT agreements or parts of
agreements which affect only tariff schedules of other countries have
not been proclaimed by the United States.216 Since these are obligations running to this country, there is no need for a domestic law
effect here, and it is reasonable to omit proclaiming them. In fact,
in some of these cases the United States is not even a party to the
agreements. 217 Third, some of the unproclaimed agreements are
short-term temporary measures or are confined to administrative
matters for which it is difficult to see why domestic legal consequences would or should occur.218
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See, e.g., agreements nos. 30 &: 52 in app. C.
See agreements nos. 41, 52, 57 &: 83 in app. C.
See agreement no. 57 in app. C.
See, e.g., agreements nos. 18, 19, 29 &: 30 in app. C.
See, e.g., agreement no. 48 in app. C.
See, e.g., agreements nos. 4 &: 36 in app. C.
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Most of the original GATT agreement was proclaimed, of
course, as well as almost all of the modifications to the general
articles, 219 except for the recently added Part IV which apparently is
not intended to be domestic law. 220 However, certain agreements
which affect basic GATT obligations, but which do not actually
modify the text, have not been proclaimed. 221 In addition, some
agreements providing for provisional accession of new members to
GATT have not been proclaimed, although it could be argued that
such proclamation is unnecessary. 222
Sometimes there is a considerable time gap between entry into
force of a particular GATT agreement and its proclamation in this
country. This may be due more to the political complexion of the
executive branch than to the operation of any legal theory. Thus,
during the mid-1950's, GATT agreements tended not to get proclaimed at all. It is difficult to ascertain from published sources
whether this state of affairs was due to antagonism to GATT and
GATT policy on the part of certain governmental officials, or to
the Bricker Amendment223 "scare" which may have prompted the
Republican Administration to avoid using executive agreements
to generate domestic law whenever possible. These political factors
might also explain the State Department position, taken in its
letter to the Hawaii court, 224 that GATT has no legal effect on state
law. In late 1962, with a new administration in office, there were
several massive presidential proclamations which incorporated a
number of early previously unproclaimed GATT agreements. 225
The presidential proclamation practice, then, supports the
hypothesis that it is the proclamation which is domestic law. This is
clearest when domestic tariff schedules are concerned. Whether it is
also true when the general clauses of GATT are involved cannot,
perhaps, be inductively proved from the record.

2. Presidential Power To Give Domestic Legal Effect
to Trade Agreements
Although it is clear that the President can, in some contexts,
enter into an executive agreement which will itself have domestic
219. See app. C.
220. See agreement no. 98 in app. C.
221. See agreement no. 59 in app. C. But see agreement no. 78 in app. C.
222. See, e.g., agreements nos. 87 & 92 in app. C.
22!!. See W. BISHOP, INTERNA110NAL I.Aw, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 104-05 (2d ed.
1962); P. KAUPER, CoNSTITUTIONAL I.Aw, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 265 (3d ed. 1966).
224. See note 288 infra.
225. Presidential Proclamation No. !1513, !! C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 246. See app. C.
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legal consequences,226 there has been no assertion of this power in
connection with GATT. 227 Insofar as the President makes agreements pursuant to the power delegated to him by the various trade
agreements acts, it seems very dubious that he can give them
domestic legal effect without proclaiming them.
The court of appeals opinion in the Capps case, mentioned
earlier,228 while holding that the executive agreement there involved
was ultra vires and void, announced another reason for not enforcing a contract which was made pursuant to the agreement:
There was no pretense of complying with the requirements of this
statute. The President did not cause an investigation to be made
by the Tariff Commission, the Commission did not conduct an
investigation or make findings or recommendations, and the President made no findings of fact and issued no proclamation. • • .229

Although the Supreme Court did not discuss this aspect while affirm.
ing on different grounds, the Capps case suggests that where regulation of foreign commerce is involved, the statutory scheme must be
followed. If this suggestion were accepted, few if any trade agreements could have domestic law validity through the exercise of
presidential powers. The statutory scheme would need to be followed, and as argued above, proclamation would be essential for
domestic law validity. It may be noted that the government's petition for certiorari in the Capps case took a less restrictive view of
the executive's power.230
C. Summary
To summarize the analysis of GATT's place in United States
domestic law, it seems that insofar as GATT (including all its
related protocols) is entered into by the President pursuant to the
trade agreements acts, it becomes domestic law only by virtue of
a "proclamation." Both the statutory language and the legislative
history lead to this conclusion. The practice of the courts and the
presidential proclamation practice have not, at least, been incon226. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); Rll.sTATEMENT § 144.
2'l:l. This statement is limited to the GATT agreements listed in app. C.
228 See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954): text accompanying note 141 supra.
229. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd
on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954).
230. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 195!1),
atfd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1954).
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sistent with this proposition. Moreover, this method of handling
the domestic law effect of executive agreements has many admirable
features from a policy viewpoint. One of the difficulties in determining the domestic legal effect of treaties and international agreements is the question of whether they are self-executing or not.231
In the case of executive agreements, this difficulty can be largely
overcome if a domestic legal effect results only from a proclamation
or other domestic law-giving action. Not only are some ambiguities
resolved by this methodology, but in certain circumstances this
technique adds flexibility to the conduct of foreign relations. For
example, the effectiveness or domestic application of an international agreement can be conditioned upon factual or other conditions precedent, with the proclamation being the certification of
the meeting of the conditions. Additionally, and speaking pragmatically, this technique gives the President affirmative control over
the domestic legal effect which he may need to exercise in some cases,
even if it means a breach of an international obligation. It also
gives Congress greater flexibility and control since Congress can
prescribe limits to the power to proclaim, just as it may prescribe
limits to the power to enter into agreements, and the extent of the
two powers need not always coincide.
On the other hand, requiring a presidential proclamation is
cumbersome and, because of the technical nature of the subject,
may lead to error.232 A court confronted with a case where the
proclamation deviated from the trade agreement for no apparent
reason would probably find a way to follow the trade agreement
language,233 either by "construing" the proclamation to be consistent with the agreement, or by concluding, in the face of the
arguments to the contrary, that the agreement had a direct legal
effect on domestic law. Perhaps an appropriate solution in future
trade agreement legislation would be to abandon the old two-part
formula, which, it will be remembered, stemmed from a period
when fear of Supreme Court invalidation on grounds of delegation
231. See REsl'ATEMENT §§ 141 (comment), 142 (comment).
232, See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 2865 (recital no. 10), 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953
Comp. 38; Presidential Proclamation No. 3190 (recital no. 13), 3 C.F.R. 1954-1958
Comp. 118; Presidential Proclamation No. 3278, 3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 9; Presidential Proclamation No. 3562, 3 C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. 315; Presidential Proclamation No. 3597, 33 C.F.R. 1964 Supp. 51. As to the formalistic nature of the recitals,
see H.R. REP. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1958) (minority views).
233. Of course, if the differential were substantial or based on substantive reasons,
the proclamation would be followed as domestic law. An example of a proclamation
deviating from the related GATT agreement is Presidential Proclamation No. 3040
(para. 8 relating to Uruguayan accession to GATT), 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 211.
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of legislative power were greater, and when (prior to Belmont and
Pink) executive agreements were even less understood than they are
today. The advantages of the old formula, mentioned above, could
be retained and some of the disadvantages discarded if a regulation
procedure were adopted authorizing the President or his delegate
to take action which would give domestic legal effect to a trade agreement to the extent desired by the President and within his power
as delegated by Congress.
III.

THE EXTENT OF GAIT'S DOMESTIC LAW EFFECT
IN THE UNITED STATES

Part II dealt with the question whether GATT has any domestic law effect in the United States. The conclusion reached was that
to the extent GATT and subsequent protocols have been "proclaimed" by the President they have a domestic law effect. It was
suggested that it was very dubious that GATT agreements and
protocols would have domestic legal effect in the United States per
se, that is, without proclamation. Since the original GATT agreement and many amending protocols have, in fact, been proclaimed, 234 the next question concerns the relationship of this
GATT "law" to both federal and state law in the United States.
To put it another way, assuming GATT is "law" in the United
States, at least to the extent that it has been proclaimed, is that
law superior or inferior to other federal or state laws?
Two GATT provisions have a profound influence on this
question; consequently, much of this part of the article is concerned
with interpreting these two clauses. First, and most significant, is
the clause in the Protocol of Provisional Application (through which
GATT is applied) which states that governments will apply "Part
II of that Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with
existing legislation."235 Second, of concern only to the relation of
GATT to state or territorial law, is paragraph 12 of article XXIV
which states:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may
be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities
within its territory.2as
234. See app. C, and text accompanying note 105 supra.
235. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950).
236. GATT, art. XXIV, para. 12. Originally this was art. XXIV, para. 6 of GATT,
but the amendments contained in the "Special Protocol Relating to Art. XXIV"
(see app. C. agreement no. 7) renumbered the paragraphs.
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A. GATT and Federal Law
The general principles of American law concerning executive
agreements which have domestic law effect are typically stated as
follows: (1) executive agreements pursuant to acts of Congress supersede prior inconsistent legislation and are superseded (as domestic
law) by subsequent inconsistent legislation; (2) executive agreements pursuant only to the President's independent authority do
not supersede inconsistent legislation, whether prior or subsequent.237 For this purpose GATT would probably be considered
an executive agreement by most lawyers and officials, but since it
derives its domestic law effect from the presidential proclamations,
it is technically more precise to analyze these proclamations as if
they were regulations issued by the executive.238 As regulations,
however, they apparently have the same impact on prior and subsequent legislation as executive agreements: if pursuant to congressional authority, the later in time prevails; if not, the legislation
prevails.239
Analysis of GATT vis-a-vis federal law must give separate treatment to Part II, which alone is subject to the "existing legislation"
clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application. The othersParts I, III, and IV-may be treated as ordinary executive agreements.
I. Parts I, III b IV of GATT
Parts I and III were part of the original GATT and were proclaimed by the President.240 The more recent addition, Part IV, has
not been proclaimed,241 and therefore probably has no domestic law
effect.242 In any case its provisions are such as to make it unlikely
2!17. R.FsrATEMENT §§ 142, 14!1, 144. See authorities cited in note 172 supra.
2!18. See the discussion in text at pt. II.B.
2!19. Of course, if a court were faced with such a case, an attempt would be made
to construe so as to avoid inconsistency. Also, a regulation would probably yield even
to prior legislation unless the legislation authorizing that regulation clearly manifested
an intent to override prior legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, !161 U.S. 4!11
(1960). However, it has been the general practice of the courts to give precedence to
the tariff proclamations (a form of regulation) over such prior inconsistent legislation
as the Tariff Act of 19!10. See authorities cited in notes 104 &: 105 supra.
240. See app. C.
241. The text of Pt. IV of GA'IT is contained in GA'IT Doc. IPRO/65-1 (1965),
and at 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 922 (1964). Part IV entered into force for the countries
which had signed it on June 27, 1966. GATT Press Release 962 (June 28, 1966).
242. As contended in the text, a proclamation is probably necessary for domestic
law effect. It could be argued, however, that Pt. IV was entered into pursuant to
presidential constitutional powers and not pursuant to authority delegated by the
Trade Agreements Act, thus, no proclamation would be needed to give domestic
law effect. Indeed, as indicated in the discussion in the text at Pt. II.B., there may be
1ome difficulty in tying United States entry into Pt. IV to authority under the Trade
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that a concrete case could come up in domestic law, 243 and its language strongly suggests that it was not intended to be self-executing.244
Part I, containing the most-favored-nations and tariff concession
provisions, and Part III, consisting mostly of administrative provisions, as proclaimed, appear to supersede prior inconsistent federal
legislation. 245 This is clearly the case where domestic tariff rates are
involved; the courts have uniformly held the latest GATT protocols
to be the current law. 246 Indeed, no case holding a pre-GATT federal
law superior to Part I or Part III of GATT has been found. Subsequent federal legislation would, of course, prevail under the "later
in time" rule. 247

2. Part II of GATT and the "Existing Legislation" Clause
The major example of subsequent United States legislation inconsistent with Part II of GATT is the 1951 amendment to the
AAA248 requiring certain agriculture import quotas to be imposed
Agreements Act. On the other hand, the language of Pt. IV can also be read as nonself-executing. I have intentionally set out the alternatives in a qualified and tentative
manner to illustrate the ambiguous position that Pt. IV has in United States law.
243. See discussion in text at II.A.3. Part IV consists primarily of general principles
and objectives, or procedures for consultation. The article involving commitments,
art. XX.XVII, is qualified by the language "to the fullest extent possible," or phrases
such as "make every effort" or "give active consideration."
244. The qualifying language mentioned in the previous footnote also suggests that
Pt. IV is not self-executing.
245. Unless specific exception for prior legislation is made in a particular clause,
such as that in art. II, para. l(b).
246. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
247. In a 1951 statute, for example, Congress stipulated as follows:
As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to
suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of
duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession
contained in any trade agreement entered into under authority of section 350 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended and extended, [the Reciprocal Trade Agreements provisions] to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to
imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world communist movement.
At that time Czechoslovakia was the only communist country which was a party to
GATT, and the President withdrew GATT "application" from that country.
Presidential Proclamation No. 2935, 3 C.F.R. 1949-1953 Comp. 121, carried out by letter
to the Secretary of the Treasury (reproduced in T.D. 52837). This action may have been
inconsistent with GATT, although the United States obtained a "declaration" from
GATT which "took note" of the United States action and may constitute a waiver
under art. XXV of GATT, BISD II/36. See also Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT-Legal
Aspects of a Surprising Institution. 1 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 131, 153 (1967).
In other post-GATT statutes, "escape clause" language was adopted that did not
coincide with the relevant GATT clause in art. XIX. 65 Stat. 7!. (1951); 69 Stat. 166
(1955). The United States Executive, however, apparently took the position that
the 1951 statute was consistent with art. XIX. Report on Trade-Agreement Escape
Clauses. Message from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 328, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
But cf. s. METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 47 (1964).
248. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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irrespective of GATT commitments contained in article XI, Part II
of GATT. This example confirms the superiority of later federal
legislation over GATT in United States domestic law.
More interesting, however, is the case of pre-GATT legislation.
Because the Protocol of Provisional Application applies Part II of
GATT subject to "existing legislation,"249 the usual rule making
executive agreements superior to prior inconsistent legislation is
reversed. Although the Administration has undertaken to furnish
Congress2 r;o and, later, GATT headquarters 251 with a listing of such
prior inconsistent legislation, there are several interpretative difficulties relating to the terms "existing" and "inconsistent" in the
Protocol.
As to "existing," the question naturally arises: "existing when?"
This ambiguity was considered in an early GATT session and
was resolved there when the Contracting Parties "accepted" a ruling
by their chairman that "existing legislation" refers "to legislation
existing on 30 October 1947, the date of the Protocol as written at
the end of its last paragraph."252 The argument that the relevant
point of time is the date on which a given nation signed the protocol was not adopted. 253 Another puzzle relating to the meaning of
"existing" is the treatment of amendments to Part II. For example,
a sequence such as the following could occur: (1) October 30, 1947,
the Protocol of Provisional Application is signed agreeing to apply
GATT; (2) in 1950, United States legislation consistent with the
existing GATT is enacted; (3) in 1955, a protocol amending GATT
249. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051 (1947); 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950).
250. Hearings on Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1195 (1951). See also Note, 61 CoLUM. L. REv.
505 (1961).
251. See GATT Doc. L/2375/Add.l, at 17 (1965), which reproduces information
submitted by governments in January 1955 and previously included in document
L/309/Add. I &: 2. This list, and that cited in note 250 supra, may not be all inclusive
-see the language used to introduce those lists.
252. Ruling by the Chairman on Aug. 11, 1949, GATT, 2 BISD 35 (1952); GATT
Doc. CP.3/SR.40, at 4-7 (1949). See Jackson, supra note 247, at 139.
253. Protocols that involved accession of new contracting parties under art. XXXIII
of GATT, subsequent to the Protocol of Provisional Application, have been more
explicit as to the date of "existing legislation." See, e.g., the Annecy Protocol of Terms
of Accession in GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX 173 (2d rev. 1966); The Protocol for the
Accession of Switzerland, GATT, 14th supp. BISD 6 (1966). As to countries which
became GATT contracting parties through sponsorship under art. XXVI, it is not
clear what is the relevant date for "existing legislation," although technically it is
probably that date which was the relevant date for the sponsoring contracting party.
This would be consistent with the view that the sponsored government accepts GATT
on the terms and conditions "previously accepted by the metropolitan government on
behalf of the territory in question." See Report adopted on December 7, 1961 by the
Contracting Parties, GATT, 10th supp. BISD 69, 73 (1962). Jackson, supra, note 247, at

144.
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enters into force, and this protocol is inconsistent with the 1950
statute. What would be the status of the 1950 legislation? Technically, the later in time would prevail, which here is the GATT
protocol. Since the GATT amending provision254 states that amendments are applicable only to those nations which accept them, the
President can always refuse to accept an amendment which is inconsistent with domestic law if he desires to avoid the inconsistency.255
An interpretative difficulty also turns on the word "inconsistent."
The following hypotheticals will assist in forming the issues:
A. Legislation at the time the United States entered GATT authorized the President to impose quotas on widgets, and previously the President had imposed such a quota.
B. Similar legislation existed when the United States entered
GATT, but the President only later imposed the widget quota.
C. Existing legislation required the President to impose the quota
whenever he found fact X, and the President had previously
found that fact and imposed the quota.
D. Similar legislation existed when GATT was entered, but only
later did the President find fact X and impose the quota.
Under interpretations developed in the practice of GATT, cases
A and B would not be "inconsistent" and would be violations by
the United States of its international obligation if the quotas were
permitted to continue. Cases C and D, however, are "inconsistent"
and would not be such violations. The GATT interpretation is
that measures are within the "existing legislation" clause, provided
that the legislation on which it is based is by its terms or expressed
intent of a mandatory character-that is, it imposes on the executive
authority requirements which cannot be modified by executive
action. 256 This interpretation is supported by statements in the
preparatory work of GATT which will be discussed below.257
But what is the domestic law effect of cases A through D? Where
254. GATT, art. XXX.
255. The President could, if he had the trade agreements authority to do so,
always enter a trade agreement which was inconsistent with GATT, but refuse to
proclaim it. In this event, the agreement would not have a domestic law effect, and
would not override the domestic law. The United States would be in a technical
breach of its international obligation, but the President might decide to do things in
this manner in the hope that a change in the legislation could ultimately be obtained
to bring it into conformity with the international obligation. Of course, a more
desirable procedure might be to sign the international agreement ad referendum
and then seek congressional approval.
256. Report approved by the Contracting Parties on August 10, 1949, GATT Doc.
CP.3/60/REV.l, para. 99, reprinted in GATT 2 BISD 49, 62 (1952). See the discussion
of GATT preparatory work contained in text at pt. II.B.1.; Jackson, supra note 247,
at 140. See also GATT documents reproduced in GATT, 7th supp. BISD 104-07
(1959), 6th supp. BISD 60-61 (1958), 3d supp. BISD 249 (1955), 1st supp. BISD 61 (1953).
257. See text accompanying note 277 infra.
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the legislation, although inconsistent with Part II of GATT, is not
deemed a violation of the international obligation pursuant to the
"inconsistent legislation" clause (cases C and D), it would seem
clear that it should be considered superior to GATT as domestic
law even though GATT is subsequent.258 This puts the domestic
law interpretation of the "inconsistent legislation" clause in line
with the international obligation, and recognizes the superiority of
the domestic law.
In case B, the quota imposed, being subsequent to GATT,
would prevail in domestic law under the "later in time" rule, even
though this would be a clear violation of the international obligation.259 Case A, however, is more difficult. If for domestic law purposes an inconsistency is found, then the "later in time" rule would
provide that the previously established quota was abrogated automatically when GATT became domestic law. But the scope of the
President's proclamation should be determinative of this question
as to domestic law, and the impact on the previous inconsistent
quota would depend on the tenor and interpretation of the subsequent GATT proclamation.
B. GATT and State Law

When GATT is considered in relation to inconsistent state
law, both of the "problem" clauses of GATT, the "existing legislation" clause already discussed and the "local governments" clause,
are involved. Additionally, an important constitutional problem is
presented: whether federal control of "foreign commerce" is exclusive and precludes any state regulation of foreign imports or exports.
The classic case, of course, was Brown v. Maryland in 1827,260
holding invalid a state law requiring an importer of foreign goods
to obtain a state license for a fee. In recent years, several cases in258. There is a logical circularity involved in cases C and D in a nation like the
United States where an executive agreement pursuant to legislative authority can
override previous legislation. Since the Protocol of Provisional Application clause on
"existing legislation" was intended to make GATT apply to the fullest extent of
executive authority, if the Executive has the authority to enter into and proclaim
an international agreement which then has the domestic law effect of overriding
previous legislation, it could be argued that GATT, even if applied by the Protocol
of Provisional Application, should override previous legislation, if this country is to
fulfill its international obligations. However, the whole gist of the preparatory work
of GATT, and the representations made by the executive branch to Congress, is to
the effect that existing legislation would not be affected by GATT without further
action by Congress. Thus, despite the fact that to apply GATT to the fullest extent of
executive authority would be to override previous federal legislation, it is clear that
that was not the intent of the GATT draftsmen.
259. See authorities cited in note 237 supra.
260. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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valving various types of local government regulation of imports261for example, labeling regulations262 and state agency purchasing
preferences263-have been decided, including one Supreme Court
case concerning a tax which discriminated against imports.264 It is
not my intention here to deviate from the purpose of this article
to examine this constitutional question in detail. I do want to draw
the reader's attention to the issue, however, and note that it can be
used as an alternative argument for the invalidity of state law in
virtually every case involving a conflict between GATT and state
law.205

I. The "Existing Legislation" Clause

In the four state or territorial cases found which cite GATT,266
Part II clauses have been invoked to override a state law. Some of
261. The four state and territorial cases involving GATT cited in note 108
supra are among those cases. In addition, there have been several such cases which do
not make any reference to GATT. These include, for example, Ness Produce Co. v.
Short, 263 F. Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1966), affd., 385 U.S. 537 (1967) (holding that a meat
labeling law which was based on country of origin, not quality, was not a valid
exercise of police power); Tuppman Thurlow Co., Inc. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966) (holding invalid a Tennessee meat labeling statute); Tuppman Thurlow
Co., Inc. v. Todd, 230 F. Supp. 230 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (holding invalid an Alabama
Meat Inspection Law which had resulted in seizure of meat imports); Cunard S.S.
Co. v. Lucci, 94 N.J. Super. 440 (Super. Ct. 1966) (holding unconstitutional a state
statute requiring that every advertisement for maritime passage indicate the flag of
registry of the vessel); City of Columbus v. Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 N.E.2d
923 (Mun. Ct. 1963); City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 331, 195 N.E.2d
916 (Mun. Ct. 1963).
262. The Tennessee Tuppman-Thurlow and Ness cases cited in note 261 supra
involved labeling statutes.
263. The Baldwin-Lima and Bethlehem Steel cases (see note 108 supra), as well as
the California Attorney General's opinions, cited in note 106 supra, involved state
"Buy American" statutes. The opinion in the Bethlehem Steel case suggests that even
this type of statute is unconstitutional under the federal Constitution. See note 286
infra. This view is propounded by Note, 12 STAN. L. R.Ev. 355 (1960).
264. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
265. Since GATT is entirely concerned with the question of international trade
within the definition of "foreign commerce" in the United States Constitution, it can
be seen that every portion of GATT in relation to state laws involves this constitutional issue. Presumably, the federal power over foreign commerce, even if it is
exclusive and pre-empts state regulation of foreign commerce, would have to be
balanced against the police power of the state and necessary state regulation for the
health, welfare, and morals of its citizenry. GATT, art. XX excepts from the application of GATT measures "necessary to protect public morals," "necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health," and similar purposes, provided that "such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade • • • ." It is possible that as the cases
and United States constitutional law develop, this article of GATT may play a part
in defining the borderline between federal pre-emption in matters of foreign commerce,
and state regulation for the protection of the health, welfare, and morals of its
citizens.
266. See note 108 supra.
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these laws existed prior to the signing of the Protocol on October
30, 1947,267 the relevant date for the "existing inconsistent legislation" exemption.268 There is some question whether this clause was
meant to apply to local as well as federal legislation. Three sources
of interpretive evidence relating to this question will be examined:
the GATT preparatory work, GATT practice, and United States
government interpretations and practice.
The first several drafts of GATT did not mention an exception
for "existing legislation" for any part of GATT.269 After tariff
negotiations had begun at Geneva, however, all participating delegations were asked whether their respective governments could put
GATT into effect at the end of the conference.27° From the answers
received, it was learned that a number of governments, while having
authority to agree to lower tariffs, could not, without parliamentary
approval, agree to those portions of GATT which dealt with nontariff barriers and other general matters, most of which were contained in Part II of GATT.271 Some delegates, therefore, urged
postponing GATT's entry into force until the end of the Havana
Conference (when the ITO Charter would be complete),272 but
others feared that such a postponement would be dangerous, since
the momentum of the tariff negotiations would be lost, leaks in
information might occur, political opposition to the tariff concessions might develop, and disruption in international trade could
result. 273 The alternative of putting the tariff concessions into effect
without any general non-tariff provisions was unacceptable to some
representatives, who felt that the tariff commitments could be too
easily evaded without the additional protective clauses of Part II.274
Consequently, when a working party reported a full draft of GATT,
its recommendation was to include, as an article of GATT, a clause
similar to the "existing legislation" language ultimately adopted
in the Protocol of Provisional Application. The working party's
explanation was as follows:
It will be noted that application of Part II is to take place "to the
fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." The posi267. This is true for this California statute invoked in the California cases and in
the California Attorney General's opinions.
268. See text accompanying note 252 supra.
269. The latest of these early drafts is contained in Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 65 (March 5, 1967).
270. U.N. Doc. EPCT/100 Gune 18, 1947).
271. U.N. Doc. EPCT/135 Guly 24, 1947).
272, U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/4, at 8 (Aug. 20, 1947).
273. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/1, at 3 (Aug. 5, 1947).
274. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TA.C/PV/1, at 24 (Aug. 5, 1947).
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tion of governments unable to put Part II of the Agreement fully
into force on a provisional basis without changes in existing legislation is, therefore, covered.2 75
Later, this clause was taken out of the Agreement itself, and put
into the separate Protocol.276
Explanations of the "existing legislation" clause were made on
several occasions. A committee, reporting on the countries that
would be able to give provisional application to GATT, stated
that "provisional application is interpreted as meaning that action
in accordance with Article XXXII which can be taken by executive
action." 277 At another point in the deliberations, an American
delegate explained the clause as follows:
I think the intent is that it should be what the executive authority
can do-in other words, the Administration would be required to
give effect to the general provisions to the extent that it could do
so without either (1) changing existing legislation or (2) violating
existing legislation. If a particular administrative regulation is necessary to carry out the law, I should think that that regulation would,
of course, have to stand; but to the extent that the Administration
had the authority within the framework of existing laws to carry
out these provisions, it would be required to do so.278
Thus the purpose of the "existing legislation" clause is clear: it was
to enable governments which would not otherwise be legally able
to do so, to put GATT into provisional effect soon after the Geneva
Conference closed. Additionally, it was realized that the Havana Conference might result in some changes to portions of the GATT
agreement, particularly Part II, 279 and it seemed reasonable to allow
countries with inconsistent legislation to wait until the results of
that conference were knovm before taking legislative action. In any
event, it appears that the clause thus excepted from GATT only
those laws that could not be affected by executive action without the
help of the legislature.
As previously indicated, the Administration in 1951 presented
to Congress a list of legislation it deemed inconsistent with
GATT. 280 No state legislation was contained in this list. This could
be taken as evidence that it was felt that the "existing legislation"
275. U.N. Doc. EPCT /135, at 9 Guly 24, 1947).
276. U.N. Doc. EPCT/196 (Sept. 13, 1947).
277. U.N. Doc. EPCT/W/301, at 7 (Aug. 15, 1947).
278. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/5, at 20 (1947). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/
PV/23, at 15-16 (1947).
279. See GATT, art. XXIX, para. 2.
280. See note 250 supra.
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clause was not intended to exempt state legislation. A counter
argument, however, would be that the Administration did not
believe it was necessary to bring state legislation under the "existing
legislation" clause because, under article XXIV:12, it was not affected anyway. More likely, the Administration simply was not
aware of this problem when the list was compiled.
As to the practice of GATT, a thorough search for relevent
documents turned up only one instance when the issue of the relation of the "existing legislation" clause to state legislation was
recognized. This was in the report of India in response to a request
for a list of "existing legislation" from each GATT party:
At the outset it is necessary to point out that in India the powers
to legislate over matters affecting trade and commerce vest not only
in the Indian Parliament but also in the Legislatures of the States
(formerly Provinces of British India and Indian States). Within
the time given, no attempt whatsoever could be made to examine
the legislation of the various States and no idea can, therefore, be
formed at this stage of the possible scope of the Government of
India's obligation under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV.281
What, then, can one conclude about state "existing legislation"
and GATT? I suggest that, based on the preparatory works of
GATT, the purpose of the "existing legislation" clause was to
require a country to apply GATT to the fullest extent of its "executive power." In the context of the preparatory meetings, "executive" meant federal executive. Following this line of reasoning, the
question depends on whether the federal executive authority can
override state legislation. In the United States it is settled that a
valid executive agreement is superior to state law. 282 Additionally,
a President's valid proclamation or regulation is, under the supremacy clause, superior to state legislation.283 Thus, it can be concluded
that state legislation "existing" at the time of GATT was not within
the meaning of the exception in the Protocol of Provisional Application.
This position can also be supported as a matter of policy. The
need for federal control over matters affecting foreign commerce,
recognized in the Constitution, should tip the scales in favor of
federal law. This rationale has, as was discussed above, led a number
281. GATT Doc. L/2375/Add.I, at 11 (1965), reproducing GATT Doc. L/309 (1955).
282. See cases cited in note 226 supra; REsTATEM:ENT §§ 141-44 (1965).
283. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 477 (1936) (holding regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission superior to state law). Consequently, insofar
as the President's order is pursuant to delegation of Congress, this case supports the
proposition in the text.
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of courts to negate state laws affecting foreign commerce without
relying on GATT at all. Where federal law on the subject exists,
there is even more reason to hold that the states cannot regulate.

2. The "Local Government" Clause
Even if state law is not excepted from GATT superiority by
other provisions of the agreement, it has been argued284 that it
is made so exempt by the language of Article XXIV, paragraph 12:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may
be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities
within its territory.2s5

Simple and straightforward as it appears, this language contains
an ambiguity that has an important impact on the domestic law
application of GATT. The opposing interpretations can be expressed as follows:
(A) The language does not change the binding application of
GATT to political subdivisions, but it recognizes that in a
federal system certain matters are legally within the power of
subdivisions and beyond the control of the central government.
In such a case, the central government is not in breach of its
international obligations when a subdivision violates GATT,
as long as the central government does everything within its
power to ensure local observance of GATT.
(B) On the contrary, this language indicates that GATT was not
intended to apply as a matter of law against local subdivisions
at all, and even when the central government has legal power
to require local observance of GATT, it is not obligated under
GATT to do so, but merely to take "reasonable measures."
If the second interpretation is correct, then GATT cannot be
invoked as a matter of law in any state proceeding involving state
law. This precise issue has arisen in several cases, including a very
recent California case.286 The unanimous conclusion of the courts
284. Brief for Petitioner, Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165,
897591 (Super Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966). The argument is discussed in l!6 CAL.
ATT'Y GEN. OP. 147, 148-49 (1960).
285. This paragraph was originally numbered 6 of art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(1950). Subsequently, amendments to art. XXIV (see authorities cited in note 236
supra) changed the number to 12.
286. Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899165, 897591 (Super. Ct.
County of Los Angeles 1966). The court, while finding that the Baldwin-Lima case
(see note 108 supra) was controlling, indicated that if the case were one of first
impression that he would hold that "the Buy American Act is a violation of the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution." Further, relying on the Imposts
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thus far has been that GATT does apply to and override state or territorial law. 287 However, the State Department took the contrary
position in a letter to the Hawaii Territorial Supreme Court in
the earliest of these cases. This letter, 288 signed by the then State
Department Legal Advisor, Herman Phleger, referring to Article
XXIV:12, stated:
This provision . . . has always been interpreted as preventing the
General Agreement from overriding legislation of political subdivisions of contracting parties inconsistent with the provisions of
the Agreement; by placing upon contracting parties the obligation
to take reasonable measures to obtain observance of the Agreement
by such subdivisions, the parties indicated that as a matter of law
the General Agreement did not override such laws. . . . In light of
the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article XXIV . . . the reliance
by the Supreme Court of the Territory on Article VI, clause 2 of
the United States Constitution to invalidate the legislation would
appear to have been based on a misconception of the General
Agreement and of its effect on the legislation of the parties to it ...
it is suggested that you might desire to request a rehearing of the
case on the basis that the particular constitutional grounds relied
on are not appropriate in view of paragraph 12 of Article XXIV.
This letter is consistent with the testimony of a State Department official in hearings before a Senate Committee in 1949, oneand-one-half years after GATT was signed. Referring to article
XXIV: 12, the colloquy was as follows:
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, with reference to that, what can we
do about it? Supposing any of our States, within their proper constitutional authority, put up a ta.x. that is inconsistent with the proand Duties clause of the Constitution (art. I, § 10), the court stated that a state could
not constitutionally impose such a "complete embargo" as results from the Buy
American Act. The court did not undetrake to examine the bases of GATT in United
States law, but accepted it as superior to state legislation without discussion, while
denying the injunction petition on grounds of existence of an adequate remedy at law.
Oral Opinion of the Court, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commr's, supra, Judge
Charles A. Loring, rendered December 22, 1966. Copy on file Michigan Law Review
office. On May 2, 1967, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgement.
Letter from Kenneth W. Downey, Deputy City Attorney of Los Angeles, dated May
9, 1967; copy on file Michigan Law Review office. It is understood that the decision is
being appealed.
287. The Texas case turned on another legal issue, but the remaining state and
territorial cases (see cases cited in note 108 supra) so applied GATT.
288. Letter from Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to
Mr. Sharpless, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, February 26, 1957. This letter is on
file in the Department of the Attorney General of Hawaii, as contained and certified
in an affidavit of April 5, 1967, by Burt T. Kobayashi, Attorney General of the State
of Hawaii, It was filed by the attorneys for plaintiff in Bethlehem Steel Corporation
v. Board of Comm'rs, Civil Nos. 899591 (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles 1966).
Portions of this letter are also quoted in L. EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF INTER·
NATIONAL BUSINESS, CAsES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS 76!1 (1964).
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visions of this article which we have been discussing? What is our
obligation?
Mr. BROWN. I do not think we could do anything about it,
Senator.
Senator MILLIKIN. Have we promised, or held out an implied
promise, to do something that we could do anything about?
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so.
Senator MILLIKIN. Let us read that.
Mr. BROWN. Let me just check.
The only commitment that we have taken, on that point, Senator,
is in the last paragraph of article XX.IV, page 82.
Senator MILLIKIN. Article XX.IV of GATT?
Mr. BROWN. Article XX.IV of the general agreement; yes.
Because it was recognized that the Federal Government did not have
the power to compel action by the local government. It only had
powers of persuasion.
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, can we accept it as beyond "iPs,"
"hut's," "maybe's" that it is not intended that the Federal Government shall attempt to conform State laws by any method whatsoever, to the provisions of this agreement?
Mr. BROWN. That may be taken categorically, but that does
not mean that the Federal Government might not get in touch with
a governor and suggest to him that he consider that a course of
action which the State is following has certain effects. But that
would be simply a matter of persuasion and consultation.
Senator MILLIKIN. Would the provisions of this article or
any other part of GATT impose upon the Federal Government
any duties to do anything as to local State laws or movements,
which are intended to promote State products, such as "Buy Georgia
Peaches," "Buy Colorado Cantaloupes," state advertising campaigns
out of public funds to promote those local buying movements?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir.
Senator MILLIKIN. Is there anything in this agreement any
place that imposes any obligation on the Federal Government to
stop anything of that sort?
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so, sir.
Senator MILLIKIN. Is there any question about it?
Mr. BROWN. No; I don't know of anything. It was not intended.289

The actual drafting history of GATT, however, leaves one with
a somewhat different impression. The language of article XXIV:12
was drawn directly from an identical provision that was in the draft
ITO Charter290 at the time the GATT draft was formulated. 291
289. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1161-62 (1949).
290. This so-called Geneva draft of the ITO Charter, the result of the Geneva
meeting, is contained in the Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Com-
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A later attempt to delete this language from GATT was rebuffed at
Geneva, with the United States delegate explaining:

Mr. Chairman, this particular paragraph was drawn from the
Charter and I think some rather careful consideration went into
its framing. I believe it is necessary to distinguish between central
or federal governments, which undertake these obligations in a firm
way, and local authorities, which are not strictly bound, so to speak,
by the provisions of the Agreement, depending of course on the constitutional procedure of the country concerned.
I think it really would be preferable to retain this language; it
has some relationship with references in other parts of the Agreement dealing with action taken by governments. I am afraid that if
we change the language of Paragraph 7 we shall probably disturb
some of the interpretations and understandings that have been
arrived at with respect to other parts of the Agreement, as well as
raising questions with regard to the Charter when we get to Havana.
Therefore I should be rather inclined to take the present draft. 292
A previous attempt to transfer the clause to Part II of GATT, so
that it would be subject to "existing legislation," also failed. 293
In working back into the history of this language as it developed
in the ITO Charter, it appears that the question of treaty application to federal subdivisions came up very soon after the start of the
first preparatory meeting in London in 1946. In connection with a
draft commitment to prevent internal tax and regulatory discrimination against imported goods (compare article III of GATT),
Australia noted:
Where the matter is one solely of action by a state, and our "external
powers" laws do not give the Commonwealth authority to act, we
would agree to use our best efforts to secure modification or elimination of any practice regarded as discriminatory.204
And, at a later point, a United States delegate noted:
The obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment in awarding contracts applied to both central and local government where
mittee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc.
EPCT/186 (1947). Article 99, para. 3 of this draft is the language identical to the
present art. XXIV:12 of GATT, except for minor changes reflecting the difference in
the instruments in which the language is located. Earlier GATT drafts likewise had
included ITO Charter versions of this same clause.
291. The earliest Geneva draft of GATT, following the fairly complete redraft
of the ITO Charter, is contained in EPCT /135 (1947). At this point the local
government clause was in art. XXII of GATT. Subsequent drafts of GATT carried
this language forward without change. See art. XXII of U.N. Doc. EPCT/189 (1947);
art. XXIV of U.N. Doc. EPCT/196 (1947); art. XXIV of U.N. Doc. EPCT/214 (1947).
292. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/19, at 32-33 (1947).
29!1. U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/11, at 43-46 (1947).
294. U.N. Doc. EPCT/13, at 1 (1946). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/7 (1946).
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the central government was traditionally or constitutionally able
to control the local government. Although he could not speak
decisively, he thought that the United States Government would be
able to control actions of states in this matter.295
A subcommittee later reported as follows:
Several countries emphasized that central governments could not in
many cases control subsidiary governments in this regard, but agree
that all should take such measures as might be open to them to
ensure the objective.296
Therefore, the subcommittee proposed the addition of a new clause
which read:
Each member agrees that it will take all measures open to it to
assure that the objectives of this Article are not impaired in any
way by taxes, charges, laws, regulations or requirements of subsidiary governments within the territory of the member govemments.297
This language, as a part of the "national treatment article," was
carried over to the next preparatory meeting in New York in early
1947. At this meeting, the clause was changed to read:
Each accepting government shall take such reasonable measures as
may be available to it to assure observance of the provisions of this
Charter by subsidiary governments within its territory.298
It was further pointed out that this problem of federal-state power
allocation also applied to other parts of the draft charter. The
clause was then transferred from the article on national treatment to
a general miscellaneous article. 299 It was in this form that the clause
first found its way into the draft GATT,300 only to be changed later
to accord with the draft ITO Charter changes as they occurred.301
Before drawing some conclusions from this history, one complicating factor must be mentioned. An interpretative note in
Annex I to GATT, relating to paragraph I of article III, states:
The application of paragraph I to internal taxes imposed by local
governments and authorities within the territory of a contracting
295. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.Il/Zl, at I (1946).
296. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/54, at 4 (1946). See also U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/64, at !I
(1946).
297. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/54, at 6 (1946).
298. U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 52 (art. 88, para. 5 of the Geneva draft of the ITO
Charter), 79 (art. XXV, para. 5 of the then GATT draft) (1947).
299. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/6, at 3 (1947), U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/55 at 5-6 (1947).
300. U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6/W.58 (art. XXII, para. 5) (1947).
301. See note 290 supra. Ultimately, the "Havana Charter," the final version of the
ITO Charter as drafted at Havana in the early part of 1948, included the local
government clause as art. 104, para. 3. U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948).
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party is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article
X..XIV. The term "reasonable measures" in the last mentioned paragraph would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national
legislation authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes
which, although technically inconsistent with the letter of Article III,
are not in fact inconsistent ·with its spirit if its repeal would result
in a serious financial hardship for the local governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or
authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of
Article III, the term "reasonable measures" would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over
a transition period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and financial difficulties.
This note was explained in the 1949 Senate hearings:
Senator MILLIKIN. Well, is it understood that this does not
apply to the United States?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, because it applies only to a national law,
and we don't have any.so2
It can be argued that the interpretative note indicates that GATT
was not intended to apply to state law, since it interprets "reasonable measures" not to require immediate overriding of a state law.
One could argue, however, that this note applies only to national
legislation. A look at the history of this troublesome note may
help elucidate its meaning.
The note was drafted at the Havana Conference on the ITO
Charter in early 1948, some months after GATT was signed.303 In
September 1948, at the Second Session of the Contracting Parties of
GATT, protocols were drafted to amend some specific portions of
GATT to take account of changes made at Havana in the corresponding ITO articles.304 Among the changes made to GATT were
those that tightened up article III, dealing with "national treatment."305 Since the Havana Conference had added an interpretative
note to the Charter when it changed the corresponding provision,
the same note was carried over into GATT when the changes were
!102. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Redprocal Trade Agreements Act Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1162 (1949).
!10!1. Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Havana, Cuba (1947-1948), U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4, at 62 (1948). This
interpretive note was in the ITO Charter at annex P, art. 18, para. 1.
!104. See GATT Doc. CP.2/SR.1-25 (1948); Report adopted by the contracting
parties (1948), GATT Doc. CP. 2/22/"RJ!.V. 1, reprinted at GATT, 2 BISD !19 (1952);
GATT, 2 BISD para. !12, at 45 (1952).
!105. GATT, 2 BISD 40 (1952).
!106. See authorities cited in notes !10!1 & !104 supra.
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made to ~rticle III.806 Reports of the Havana Conference807 suggest
that the interpretative note was a result of a compromise and a desire
to accommodate several countries who feared the political and
administrative consequences, including the revenue loss to subsidiary governments, of immediate revocation of discriminatory
internal taxes. 808 The solution agreed upon was to permit gradual
elimination of such taxes, but it was thought easier to handle this
in an interpretative note than in the text of the article itself.309 It
seems doubtful that this note was intended to affect the language in
article XXIV:12 at all. Its placement as a note to the "national
treatment" article confirms this view.810
What, then, can be concluded from the preparatory history of
article XXIV:12? The fragments of that history which were recorded
suggest that this clause was intended to apply only to the situation
in which the central government did not have the constitutional
power to control the subsidiary governments. Australia and other
countries made reference to this situation. The United States
delegate did likewise, adding his tentative judgment that the United
States did not find itself in this circumstance. Thus, it can be argued
that interpretation (A) which was presented at the outset of this
section is the correct one, despite the opposing view expressed in
the 1949 Senate Finance Committee hearings. It should be added
that the witness at that hearing may have been suffering under a
misunderstanding of United States law at the time of his testimony.
He said that "it was recognized that the Federal Government did
not have the power to compel action by the local government,"811
but the supremacy clause of the Constitution seems to belie that
statement. Furthermore, this hearing was held at a time when
political opposition to ITO and GATT was apparently growing,
and several of the Senators at the hearing were obviously hostile
and were challenging the validity of GATT in its entirety. Under
these circumstances, it is natural that the Administration spokesman
would desire to play do·wn the scope of GATT.812
307. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Reports of Comm. &: Principle
Subcomm., U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8, at 62 (Report of Subcomm. A of the 3d Comm. on
arts. 16, 17, 18 &: 19, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/59, at para. 38) (1948).
308. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.S/A/
W.30, 31-35, 47, 52 (1948); U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/SR,40, at 2 (1948).
309. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.30, at 1 (1948); U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/
W .50, at 3 (1948)
310. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W.50, at 3 (1948).
311. Hearings on H.R. 1211, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1161 (1949).
lll2. See authorities cited in note 223 supra and accompanying text.
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One can, of course, also raise the question of the comparative
relevance to GATT legal questions of the GATT preparatory work
as against United States Senate hearings. Theoretically, the preparatory work should weigh more heavily.318 Indeed, the legislative
hearings that occurred after GATT was in force are arguably irrelevant, although in practice, they are accepted as having some
value. 314 Yet the practical problem in attempting to ascribe any
meaning at all to certain GATT provisions has been the difficulty of finding and obtaining access to any GATT interpretative materials. The legislative hearings are relatively easy to find
and read, whereas GATT preparatory work is just the opposite.
For a number of years, the preparatory work material was restricted and unavailable for public use-even now, only a few
libraries or locations have a reasonable collection.315 Moreover, the
sheer volume is so great316 and indexing so poor (or non-existent),317
that even with access the attorney needs a wealthy and willing client
to be able to undertake the necessary search. There is something
of an anomaly in the fact that an instrument can have legal force in
domestic law while important interpretative material relating to
that instrument is, as a practical matter, unavailable to the domestic
lawyer or court. The anomaly is even more difficult to accept when
313. The Restatement's "criteria for interpretation" of treaties and executive
agreements include "the circumstances attending the negotiation of the agreement,"
and "drafts and other documents submitted for consideration, action taken on them,
and the official record of the deliberations during the course of the negotiation ••• .''
R.EsTATEMENT § 147.
314. Id. This section does not consider legislative discussion of an international
agreement subsequent to the time the agreement enters into force to be relevant,
although subsequent practice of one party, if the other party or parties knew or had
reason to know of it, is relevant. Id. § 147(f). As a matter of practice, legislative
materials of a major member of an international organization tend to be regarded as
significant in interpreting the agreement, even by the international staff. See Gold,
Interpretation by the International Monetary Fund of Its Articles of Agreement: II,
16 INT'L &: COMPARATIVE LAW Q. 289, 296 (1967). The Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized the relevance of administrative interpretations of international
agreements by the department charged with its negotiation and enforcement. Kolovrat
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
315. GATT headquarters in Geneva, of couISe, has a very complete collection. In
the United States, fairly complete collections exist at the United Nations Headquarters
Library, at the State Department offices in Washington, and at the International
Monetary Fund offices in "\'\Tashington. The situation has improved, however, as most
of the preparatory work is now available on microfilm. Also, GATT has recently
liberalized its restrictive policy as to current documents. See GATT Doc.5. INF/121 &:
INF/122.
316. I would estimate that the volume of materials comprising the preparatory
work for GATT and ITO (which is intermingled), amounts to something on the
order of 27,000 pages-about 100 volumes.
317. A very small number of references to the preparatory work can be found in
GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT (2d rev. 1966).
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these materials are available only to government attorneys. This
situation is not unique to foreign trade matters; indeed, it is
pervasive. Such a situation can have the practical effect of giving
the administering government agency undue influence on the ultimate interpretation of important domestic laws.318 Interestingly
enough, however, in the one clear case in which a government
agency has tried to influence a state court's interpretation of GATT,
the agency's position has so far not been followed. 319
Since there are these problems in using the preparatory work or
United States legislative history concerning GATT, and since these
materials are contradictory, it is worthwhile to note briefly some
policy arguments relating to GATT's position vis-a-vis state or local
law. There are two broad policy groupings that any state court will
face in the appraisal of the significance of GATT to state law. The
first group will consist of the policies of the particular state law
being compared with GATT, whether explicitly admitted by the
court or not. If the court feels, for example, that a state "Buy
American" statute is based on weak or faulty premises, it will be
more likely to apply GATT to override this statute, particularly
if it feels the legislature is not likely to correct defects in the
law. The second policy group involves basic questions of constitutional law and the powers of the federal government to control
foreign commerce. Various non-tariff trade barriers can be even
more inhibiting to international trade than tariffs. This fact has
clearly been recognized by both the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government.320 Local government actions
are certainly capable of frustrating international trade almost as
significantly as federal government actions.321 Therefore, meaningful international agreement on trade matters must regulate local
government actions. In this country, the Constitution gives the
federal government power so to affect local actions. 322
318. These interpretations are likely to be influenced by current policy positions
of the government agency, which in turn usually reflect current political conditions.
It is fundamental to an independent judiciary that there be free access to relevant
interpretive materials in order to formulate its conclusions independently of the
administration, even though the final result may be the same.
319. See text accompanying note 288 supra.
320. See authorities cited in note 62 supra.
321. See note 261 supra and accompanying text. See also excerpts from the memorandum of the United States as amicus curiae in Tuppman-Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252
F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), reproduced in 5 AM. Soc'y OF INT'L LAW, INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 483 (1966).
322. U.S. CONST., art. VI (the "supremacy clause'); art I, § 8 ("to regulate commerce
with foreign nations .• .'); art. I, § 10 ("no state shall, without the consent of the
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports •• .').
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But such general statements do not answer the GATT question:
Is there any reason peculiar to GATT for interpreting it (or not)
to override directly state law? The policies already expressed seem
to indicate that in case of doubt GATT should be so applied.
But countering this are the following arguments: (1) to interpret
article XXIV:12 of GATT in this manner means that GATT will
apply to different countries in different ways depending on their
constitutional structure; and (2) United States constitutional uncertainty and controversy regarding executive agreements should lead
courts to be cautious in applying such agreements to override state
law.
In reply to the first argument, it may be said that uniformity
of application is not essential, especially when the mechanism for
registering complaints and urging corrective action exists within
GATT.323 Ivforeover, the "existing legislation" clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application clearly already allows non-uniformity depending on constitutional structure.324 Indeed, it can be
argued that such international recognition and allowance for individual national constitutional differences is salutary and analogous
to the policies of federalism within nations. As to the second argument, while self-restraint by the federal legislative and executive
branches is well received in many contexts, once the executive agreement has become effective the courts should not be deterred by this
argument from giving full force under the supremacy clause to such
agreements when other policies urge such effect. Both the supremacy
clause and the foreign commerce clause of the Constitution should,
in the context of GATT, lead to a presumption that federal law,
including proclaimed executive agreements on trade, supersedes
state law.
Furthermore, this country is likely to have future occasion to
protest the use of foreign regional and local laws to restrict our
exports. In such a case, the United States, an exporting nation, will
be in a stronger position to use diplomatic means to obtain revocation of those laws, if, within this country, state and local laws are
automatically subject to GATT.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The legal position of GATT in United States domestic law turns
out to be surprisingly complex. This may be only a natural result32!1. GATT, arts. XXI1 8e XXlII (nullification and impairment, and the complaint
procedure); GATT, art. XXV (waivers and joint action).
324. See discussion in text at pt. III.B.1.
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GATT itself was a highly intricate and perplexing instrument
when born. Years of amendments and subtle changes in practice
have made it even more difficult to understand fully. It appears,
however, that the following generalizations can be made about the
domestic legal position of GATT:
I. GATT is a valid executive agreement, entered into by the
United States pursuant to authority of congressional legislation.325
2. To the extent entry into GATT is pursuant to congressional
authority, its domestic legal effect is probably achieved only
through "proclamation." Not all parts of GATT have been proclaimed, but proclaimed parts do include all changes to United
States tariff schedules and notes, as well as the original full text
of GATT's general provisions, but not some subsequent textual
amendments.326
3. Part II of GATT is expressly subject to pre-GATT federal legislation, pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application
(which was proclaimed). It is inferior to subsequent federal legislation by virtue of the usual legal principles concerning executive agreements. Thus, Part II of GATT is inferior to any
inconsistent federal legislation. Parts I and III are superior to
pre-GATT legislation, and Part IV is probably not domestic
law in the United States.327
4. It is this author's opinion that GATT is directly applicable to
state and local governments in the United States, and supersedes
state or local law even when that law is not automatically preempted by federal law, and even when such law existed prior
to GATT.328
325.
326.
327.
328.

See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

in
in
in
in

text at pt. II.A.I.
text at pt. II.B. and app. C.
text at pt. III.A.
text at pt. III.B.
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APPENDIX A
Analysis of GATT in Relation to 1945 United States Statutory Authority, Congressional History, and Prior Trade Agreements

The following chart briefly presents for each article of GATT (1) its general subject matter, (2) its statutory basis, (ll) the relevant congressional
history, and (4) similar provisions in various trade agreements entered into by the United States prior to the 1945 Trade Agreements Extension Act.
Abbreviations used arc as follows:
CR:
91 CoNG. R:Ec. (1945). The number which follows is the page.
EXC:
"Exception" (meaning the article can be justified under the Statute as being merely an exception to commitments otherwise authorized).
HH:
Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the House Ways b Means Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
The number which follows is the page.
HR:
H.R. REP. No. 594, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). The number which follows is the page.
IMP:
"Implied" (suggesting that the article is an administrative provision that can be justified as impliedly authorized by the Statute as a
necessary measure to carry out the other commitments).
"Import Restrictions" (referring to this language in the TAEA).
IR:
Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). The
SH:
number which follows is the page.
TAEA: § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and extended by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945 [19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1964)]. If a small letter follows, it refers to a subsection of 350. If a number follows, it refers to another
section of the same Act.
I, etc:
Relevant articles in prior trade agreements.
N.l, etc: Notes at the end of the chart.
It should be noted that the congressional history on any clause is often extensive, and that only one illustrative reference may have been selected
for inclusion on this chart. This analysis does not purport to show that explicit congressional approval existed for any specific clause, but merely that
the general subject matter of each GATT article was mentioned in the congressional history, and thus is arguably within the intended scope of the
legislative delegation of power. It should also be noted that, even though unmentioned in legislative history or prior precedents, clauses which are
similar to subject matter already so mentioned, such as art. lV, can be justified as within the general overall scope of negotiating authority.
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APPENDIX A

GATT
Article

General Subject

Part I
I Most-Favored-Nation Clause
II Commitment on Maximum Tariffs
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII

Part II-Safeguarding Provisions
Internal Taxation and Regulations
Cinematograph Films
Freedom of Transit
Anti-Dumping
Customs Valuation
Customs Fees and Formalities
Marks of Origin
Publication/Administration, Customs
Regulations
Quantitative Restrictions
Quantitative Restrictions (BOP Exception)
Quantitative Restrictions (MFN)
Quantitative Restrictions (BOP Exception)
Currency Manipulations and BOP
Subsidies on Exports or to Reduce Imports
State Trading &: State Monopolies
Assisting Economic Development
Escape Clause
Health and Morals Regulations
National Security Exce}?tions
Consultation
Nullification (Sanction)

Statute
TAEA
TAEA

Prior U.S. Trade Agreements

Congrcssional
History

Mexico
1942

CR-5071
HH-274

I
VII, VIII

I
VII, VIII
II

IR,N.l

HR-8

TAEA(c)
IR,EXC

CR-4999

III, IX

IR
IR

CR-4999
CR-5071

XIII

IR

HH-274
CR-4999

XII

TAEA(c)
IR

Uruguay
1942

c.,o
,_.
~

Other Trade Agreement
Precedents

Canada (1938), V

Costa Rica (1936} XI
El Salvador (1 37), XI
X

...~
~

~-

;::i..

l:i
~

VI
Canada (1938), IX

lt::).""1
~

TAEA(c)
TAEA(c)
TAEA(c),EXC
TAEA(c)
TAEA(c),EXC
IR

IR
IR
EXC
EXC
IR,EXC
EXC
IMP

IMP

HH-274

VI

HR-8

III,X

HR-8
HR-8
HR-8
CR-4886
CR-5070
CR-5071

111,X
lll,X
III,X
IV

IV

V

V

XI
XVII
XVII
XIV

xv
xv

HR-8
CR-4999
CR-5070
HH-274
HH-409

XIV

VI
XI

III

XII
XII

~

~
Sec Peru (1942), III

~~

1
Cl>
Cl>

~

"'
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APPENDIX A (Continued)

GATT

Article
XXIV
XXV
XX.VI
XXVII
XXVIII
XXIX
XXX
XX.XI
XX.XII
XXXIII
XXXIV
XXXV

General Subject

Part III-Administrative
Territorial, Application/Regional Blocs
Voting, Decisions, Waivers
Acceptance, Entry in Force
Withholding Concessions to Nonmembers
Negotiating and Modifying Tariff
Concessions
Relation to ITO
Amending GATT
Withdrawal from GATT
Contracting Parties Defined
Accession of new Members
Annexes Incorporated by Reference
Withholding Application of GATT to
New Members

Part IY-Trade and Development
Annexes: Relate to specific GATT articles
Schedules: Contain tariff concessions and
relate to art. II
Some special clauses:
"Exports"
"Principal Supplier Rule" in tariff negotiations
"Provisional Application" of the Protocol
"Local Governments," (XXIV:12)

Statute

Congressional
History

EXC
N.2
IMP
IMP

TAEA
N.3
N.4
IMP
IMP
N.5
IMP

Prior U.S. Trade Agreements
Mexico
1942

Uruguay
1942

XV,XVI

XIII,XIV
XII
XVII
N.'l

XVIII
N.'l
HH-275

HH-274

N.5

Other Trade Agreement
Precedents

N.7
XVIII
N.8
N.7
N.8

N.7

N.'l

.....
tC

.§

~

~
~

....
s
~

XVIII
N.7
XVIII
N.8
N.7
N.8

J

~

b0

~

........~
()

t"'I:)4

N.9
IMP

~

TAEA
III

N.6

III

CR-5050
Canada (1938) XVIII
XV:2
(JO
1-1

(;"I

Note I: Part II is subject to "existing legislation." See discussion in text at 11.B.I,
Note 2: The joint action provisions of art. XXV can also be justified as administrative l?rovisions necessarily implied in the authority delegated
to enter GATT. The language of art. XXV, however, is very broad on its face; 1t may well be argued that it should be limited by the
scope of GATT itself or at least that United States representatives should be subject to some limitations in voting to exercise joint
action.
Note 8: Since ITO was intended to be submitted to Congress, it can be argued that a provision governing the relationship to ITO was not
beyond the scope of the trade agreements delegation. Some provisions of art. XXIX, however, provide positive commitments themselves. Paragraph I commits parties to observe chapters I to VI and IX of the ITO Charter "to the fullest extent of their executive
authority," thereby ducking the ultra vires problem. Paragraph 6 provides that GATT parties "shall not invoke the provisions" of
GATT to prevent operation of any provision of the Havana Charter, but this seems merely an exception to GATT, not an additional
commitment. In practice the ITO Charter has apparently become a dead letter, other than as a generalized statement of principle.
Note 4: The amending article, like art. XXV, is probably justified as a necessary administrative clause. This article is discussed in more detail
in the text at II.A.3.
Note 5: Articles XXXIII (new members) and XXXV (withholding application of GATT to a new member) must be read together. Article
XXXV simply gives an option to new or old parties of GATT not to apply GATT to each other. This is analogous to a refusal to
enter a· bilateral trade agreement, and is a remnant of bilateralism in GATT.
Note 6: At the time GATT was negotiated, the President had other statutory authority over exports (see note 60 to text supra). Even if that
authority would not expressly support the clauses in GATT, it is evidence that the President had general authority to negotiate on
export matters. In addition, prior trade agreements dealt with exports.
Note 7: These provisions of GATT are not needed in a bilateral agreement because the same purposes could be effectuated by bilateral
negotiations.
Note 8: Definitional clauses or incorporating clauses do not need authorization.
Note 9: Part IV was added in 1965-1966. Its basis in United States law is discussed in text following note 160 supra.
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APPENDIX B
State Department Memorandum
The following is an excerpt from a memorandum submitted by the State Department
at the Hearings on Extending the Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1054-55 (1949):
ANALYSIS BY ARTICLES

The following analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade briefly
indicates the principal authority for the inclusion in the agreement of the basic
provisions of each article. Several of the substantive articles also contain provisions as to consultation with respect to the matter covered, which are clearly
within the President's general authority as to consultation with other governments in the carrying out of international agreements, or exceptions which in
one way or another merely limit the extent of the substantive commitments.
Moreover, the provisions of part II of the agreement, that is, articles III through
XXIII, are applicable only to the extent not inconsistent with legislation existing
on October 30, 1947.
Article I-General most-favored-nation treatment as to customs duties, the treatment of imports, with limited geographical exceptions as to duties: Under
authority for continuance of duties, customs treatment, and treatment of
imports, most-favored-nation treatment also being recognized in generalization provision of section 350 (a) and preferences by section 350 (b).
Article II-Giving effect to tariff concessions with provisions as to excise, valuation, and government-monopoly treatment to protect concessions: Under
authority to modify and continue duties, and continue customs and excise
treatment and the treatment of imports.
Articles III and IV-Nondiscriminatory treatment of imports, as compared with
domestic products, in respect of taxes and other regulations: Under authority
as to continuance of excise treatment and treatment of imports.
Article V-Transit rights: Under authority as to continuance of duties, customs
treatment, excise treatment, and the treatment of imports.
.Article VI-Antidumping and countervailing duties: Under authority as to continuance of duties and customs treatment.
Article VII-Valuation for customs purposes: Under authority as to continuance
of duties and customs treatment.
Article VIII-Customs formalities: Under authority as to continuance of customs
treatment, including charges.
Article IX-Marks of origin: Under authority as to continuance of customs treatment.
Article X-Publication and administration of trade regulations: Under the President's general authority as to international relations (especially as to publication) and authority as to continuance of customs treatment.
Articles XI and XII-Elimination of quantitative restrictions and exceptions thereto for balance of payment and other reasons: Under authority as to modification
of import restrictions, continuance of customs treatment, and treatment of
Arti~~o~II and XIV-Nondiscriminatory application of quantitative restrictions
and exceptions thereto for balance of payment and other reasons: Under
authority as to continuance of customs treatment and treatment of imports.
Article XV-Cooperation with International Monetary Fund on exchange matters:
Under the President's general authority as to international relations, relations
with the fund having been recognized by Public Law 171, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session (see especially sec. 14), and authority as to continuance of
customs treatment.
Article XVI-Consultation as to subsidies: Under the President's general authority
as to international relations, subsidies having been recognized as capable of
impairing trade agreement benefits•
.Article XVII-State trading activities: Under authority as to continuance of customs
treatment, and the treatment of imports, state trading practices having been
recognized as capable of impairing trade-agreement benefits.
Article XVIII-Exceptions for the assistance to industrial development: Under
authority as to modifications and continuance of duties and import restrictions
and treatment of imports.
Article XIX-Escape clause in case of domestic injury: Under authority as to
modification of duties and import restrictions and expressly recognized by
congressional report as desirable.
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Article XX-General exceptions: Under the President's general authority as to
international relations and authority as to continuance of customs treatment,
and treatment of imports, also recognized in numerous laws as those relating
to sanitary regulations and trademarks.
Article XXI-Security exceptions: Under the President's general authority as to
international relations and authority as to continuance of customs treatment,
and treatment of imports, also recognized in numerous laws such as regulation
of arms traffic and export-control legislation.
Article XXII-Consultation as to customs and related matters: Under the President's general authority as to international relations, also recognized by authority as to continuance of customs treatment and treatment of imports.
Article XXIII-Permissive action in case of nullification or impairment: Under
the President's general authority as to international relations and authority as to
modification of duties and import restrictions.
Article XXIV-Territorial application and certain territorial exceptions from mostfavored-nation treatment: Under the President's general authority as to international relations, territorial exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment having been recognized by section 350 (b).
Article XXV-Joint action: Under the President's general authority as to international relations, especially the effective execution of multilateral international
agreements, and authority as to modification of duties and import restrictions
and termination of proclamations under last sentence of section 350 (a) (as to
withholding of benefits under paragraph 5 (b)).
Article XXVI-Procedures as to entry into force following provisional application:
Under the President's general authority as to international relations to include
appropriate procedural provisions in agreements.
Article XXVII-Withholding and withdrawal of concessions: Under authority as to
modification and continuance of duties and import restrictions and termination
of proclamations under last sentence of section 350 (a).
Article XXVIII-Modification of schedules: Under authority as to modification and
continuance of duties and import restrictions and termination of proclamations
under section 350 (a) with recognition of termination provisions as to trade
agreements in section 2 (b) of Trade Agreements Act.
Article XXIX-Relation to International Trade Organization: Under the President's general authority as to international relations to include appropriate
termination provisions in agreements, with recognition of section 14 of Public
Law 171, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, and intention to submit International Trade Organization Charter to Congress.
.Article XXX-Amendments: Under the President's authority as to international
relations, and authority as to modification of import restrictions, and treatment
of imports.
Article XXXI-Witlidrawal from the agreement: Under the President's general
authority as to international relations, with recognition of section 2 (a) of Trade
.Agreements Act as to termination of agreements, and authority to terminate
proclamations under the last sentence of section 350 (a).
Articles X."{XII to X.UIV-Certain procedural provisions, including accession:
Under the President's general authority as to international relations to include
appropriate procedural provisions in agreements (new tariff negotiations in
connection with accession would be in accordance with procedures of Trade
Agreements Act).
Article XXXV-Withholding application: Under the President's general authority
as to international relations, with recognition of procedures provided for in the
Trade Agreements Act.
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APPENDIX C

GA.TT Agreements and United States Proclamations

Listed below arc all "official" GATT agreements, as of October 15, 1967. "Official" GATT agreements arc arbitrarily defined as those which have
been deposited with the United Nations (prior to 1955) and listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3, Rev. 1, ch. X, subch. 1 and those which have been
deposited with the Executive-Secretary of GATT since 1955 which arc listed in GATT Doc, PROT/2 (as revised to August 1967). The United
States proclamation listed is the principal one for that agreement, although others may also affect domestic application of the agreement. Other
agreements relating to GATT, such as Final Acts or various bilateral trade agreements, arc not listed here. Those other bilateral agreements
which the United States has entered and which have also been proclaimed by the President can be found in the compilation of Presidential
Proclamations in the annual United States Code Congressional Service. Proclamations which arc also published as Treasury Decisions arc contained
in the Treasury Decision Reports (T.D,) or the new Customs Bulletin, and arc listed in the index under the heading "Presidential Proclamations."
Additional proclamations affecting United States obligations to GATT may also be found in these reports.

~

In the chart which follows, these abbreviations and symbols are used:
- / -: The number before the slash indicates the volume; the number following indicates the !?age.
G
: Indicates that the document is deposited at GATT headquarters. The number following indicates the list number (PROT/2), if known.
U
Indicates that the document is deposited at U.N. headquarters. The number following indicates the list number (ST/LEG/3, Rev. 1), if
known,
NC
Indicates that the agreement did not change the United States schedule. This does not imply that omission of that statement elsewhere
means that an agreement did change the United States schedule.
None
Indicates that none was found, but proving a negative is very difficult and these proclamations are verbose and technical, so no warranty is
made that "none" exists.
Footnotes (a, b,, etc,) arc located at the end of chart.
"Date in force" refers to that date as to any country, not necessarily the United States, The source is GATT Doc. PROT /2.
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APPENDIX C

#
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Date
Done
10/30/47
Ul
10/30/47
U2
3/24/48
U3
3/24/48
U4
3/24/48
U5
3/24/48
U6
3/24/48
U7
9/14/48

us

9

9/14/48
U9

10

9/14/48
UlO

11

9/14/48
Ull
8/13/49
Ul2
8/13/49
Ul3

12
13

Title

Signed
by
U.S.

Date
In
Force

0

U.N.T.S.
Cite

Stat. or
U.S.T.
Cite

55/194

61/Pt. 5, 6

276IAn

12/8863

51802

Pres.
Proc.

Fed.
Reg,
Cite

T.D.
Number

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol of Provisional Application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol of Rectifications to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration Signed at Havana 24 March 1948
Protocol Modifying Certain Provisions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Special Protocol Modifying Article XIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Special Protocol Relating to Article XXIV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Second Protocol of Rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Signatories of
the Final Act of 30 Oct. 1947
Third Protocol of Rectifications to the Genera! Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
First Protocol of Modifications to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

X

1/1/48

55/308

61/Pt. 5, 6

2761A

12/8863

51802

X

3/24/48

62/2

62/1988

2790b

13/3269

51939

X

3/24/48

62/26

62/1962

None

None

None

X

3/24/48

62/30

62/1992

2790

13/3269

51939

X

5/9/49

62/40

62/2000

2790

13/3269

51939

~
....

g..
<§'
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~

1:1

~

X

6/7/48

62/56

62/2013

2790

13/3269

51939

X

9/14/48

62/74

62/3671

2829

14/1151

52167

::i:J

....~
Cl>

~

X

9/24/52

138/334

3/5355

2829

14/1151

52167

X

12/14/48

62/80

62/3679

2829

14/1151

52167

X

9/14/48

62/68

62/3663

2829

14/1151

52167

X

10/21/51

107 /311

3/57

2867

14/7723

52373

X

9/24/52

138/381

3/5368

2867

14/7723

52373

1.
...
Cl
Cl

Ni

10

t::,
n

14
15
16
17
18
19

20

21

22

8/13/49
UI4
8/13/49
UI5
8/13/49
UI6
10/10/49
UI7
4/3/50
UIS
12/16t0
UI
4/21/51
U20a
4/21/51
U20b
4/21/51
U20c

23

4/21/51
U20d

24

4/21/51
U20e

Protocol Modifying Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Replacing Schedule I of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Replacing Schedule VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The Annency Protocol of Terms of Accession
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Fourth Protocol of Rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Fifth Protocol of Rectifications to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing
to the Accession of the Republic of Austria
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing
to the Accession of the Federal Republic of
Germany to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Decision of the Contracting Parties .Agreeing
to the Accession of the Republic of Korea
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Decision of the Contracting Parties Agreeing
to the Accession of Peru to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing
to the Accession of the Republic of the
Philippines to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade

3/28/50

62/II4

2/1583

2867

14/7723

52373

l
~

...
co

.§

X

10/21/51

107/83

3/123

2867

14/7723

52373

X

9/24/52

138/346

3/5383

2867

14/7723

52373

X

II/30/49

62/122

64/BI39

2867c

14/7723

52373

X

9/24/52

138/398

3/5399

None (NC)

None

None

"":l
"":l

X

6/30/53

167/265

4/29

None (NC)

None

None

;:;·

~
~
~

X

6/21/51

142/9

3/597

Noned

None

None

t::,
C

X

6/21/51

142/13

3/600

Noned

None

None

~
~

.......
()

t"'I
~

X

3/603

Noned

None

None

142/22

3/606

Noned

None

None

142/26

3/609

Noned

None

None

6/21/51

142/18

X

6/21/51

X

6/21/51
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#

Date
Done

25

4/21/51
U20f

26

4/21/51
U21
4/21/51
U22

27
28

10/27/51
U23

29

10/27J51
U2

30

11/8/52
U25

31

11/22/52
U26

32

10/24/53
U27

3ll

10/24/53
U28

M

3/24/48
U-B2

Title
Decision by the Contracting Parties Agreeing
to the Accession of the Republic of Turkey
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Continued Application of
the Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
First Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
First Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Germany &: S. Africa)
Second Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Second Protocol of Supplementary Conces•
sions to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Austria and Germany)
Third Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Continued Application of
Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization

Fed.
Reg.
Cite

Signed
by
U.S.

Date
In
Force

U.N.T.S.
Cite

Stat.or
U.S.T,
Cite

X

6/21/51

142/30

3/612

Noned

None

None

X

6/6/51

142/34

3/588

2929

16/5381

527ll9

X

10/24/52

147/390

Pres.
Proc.

T.D.
Number

3/1802

None

None

None

4/2313

ll5lll

28/107

55816

~
....

~

~~

;:g

X

10/21/53

176/2

1:-"1
A

~

X

5/25/52

131/316

3/3963

None(NC)

None

None

::,;:,
(\I

....

~

X

2/2/59

321/245

10/1098

None (NC)

None

None

8/30/53

172/340

4/1631

None(NC)

None

None

X

2/2/59

321/266

None (NC)

None

None

X

1/1/54

183/351

None

None

None

Nonce

None

None

Never

None

10/347
4/2755
None

(\I

~

1
0,
0,

~
co

t:/

n

35

9/14/48
U-C2

36

8/13/49
U-C2

37

10/24/53
GI

38

39

40
41

2/1/55
G2

3/7/55
G3
3/10/55
G4
3/10/55
G5

42

3/10/55
G6

43

3/10/55
G7

Agreement on Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Areas of w·estern Germany under
Military Occupation
Memorandum of Understanding Relative to
Application to the Western Sectors of
Berlin of the Agreement on Most-FavoredNation Treatment for Areas of Western
Germany Under Military Occupation
Declaration Regulating the Commercial Relations Between Certain Contracting Parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Proces-Verbal Extending the Validity of the
Declaration of 24 Oct. 1953 Regulating
the Commercial Relations Between Certain
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Japan
Fourth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Annexes and to the Texts of
Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Continued Application of
Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Protocol AmendinJ{ Part I and Articles XXIX
and XXX of e General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Amendini the Preamble and Parts
II and III of t e General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Protocol of Organizational Amendments to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade

~

0"

X

10/14/48

18/267

62/3653

Nonce

None

None

~

...

<O

Cl

.:::I
X

8/13/49

42/356

63/2795

Nonce

None

None

~
,.,

,.,

X

ll/23/53

None

5/219

None

None

None

X

2/4/55

None

6/6163

None

None

None

~
:'l
t::,
~
~

....;g
C

X

1/23/59

324/300

X

7/1/55

220/154

10/213

3513

28/107

55816

None

None

None

........
~

t

~

X

Not yet

None

X

10/7/57

278/168

X

Not yet

None

8/1767

3513

28/107

55816

3513

28/107

55816

None

None

None
(.)0

.N)
(.)0

APPENDIX C (Continued)

#

Date
Done

44

3/10/55
GS

45

3/10/55
G9
6/7/55
GI0

46
47

6/15/55
Gll

48

7/15/55
GI2

49

7/15/55
G13

50
51

52

7/15/55
Gl4
12/3/55
GI5

12/3/55
GI6

Title
Proces-Verbal of Signature Concerning the
Protocol of Organizational Amendments to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Agreement on the Organization for Trade
Co-operation
Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Protocol of Rectification to the French Text
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Third Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Denmark &: Germany)
Fourth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Germany &: Norway)
Fifth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Germany & Sweden)
Proces-Verbal of Rectification Concerning the
Protocol (Amending Part I and Art. 29 and
30 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the
Protocol of Organizational Amendments to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Fifth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

00

Nl

Date
In
Force

X

Not yet

None

None

None

None

X

Not yet

None

None

None

None

3105

20/5379

53865

X

9/10/55

U.N.T.S.
Cite

220/164

Stat. or
U.S.T.
Cite

Fed.
Reg.
Cite

Signed
by
U.S.

6/5833

Pres,
Proc.

T.D.
Number

..i:,..

~

....
;:r,
i'
()

X

10/24/56

253/316

7/2943

3513

28/107

55816

~

9/19/56

250/292

7/2393

None (NC)

None

None

9/19/56

250/297

7/2407

None (NC)

None

None

9/19/56

250/301

7/2421

None (NC)

None

None

3513

28/107

55816

!:""I
i::o

~

::tl
(11

....

<::!
(11

X

X

10/7/57
Not yet

278/246
None

3513

28/107

55816

~

'<!

~

"'
"'
Ni
"'"
<Q

t::,

53
54

5/23/56
Gl7
2/19/57
GIB

55

4/ll,57
GI

56

6/20/57
G20

57
58

11/30/57
G21
11/30/57
G22

59

11/30/57
G23

60

11/2~58
G2

61

11/22/58
G25

62

11/22/58
G26

63

12/31/58
G27

Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General .Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Seventh Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Austria 8e Germany)
Sixth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Eighth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Cuba and U.S.)
Seventh Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Continued Application of
Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article 16:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Proccs-Verbal Extending the Validity of the
Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article 16:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Ninth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Finland 8e Germany)
Declaration on the Provisional .Accession of
the Swiss Confederation to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Relating to Negotiations for the
Establishment of New Schedule III-Brazil
-to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade

X

X
X
X

i

5/23/56

244/2

7/1083

3140

21/4237

54108

[

9/1/58

309/364

10/1720

None (NC)

None

None

.::3

3513

28/107

55816

3190

22/4705

54398

None

3513

28/107

55816

~

285/372

None

None

None

~
:.IJ

Not yet
6/29/57
Not yet
1/1/58

None
274/322

8/1343

10
0l

~
~
~

....
bC

X

5/11/59

328/290

10/1842

None

None

None

~
~
.....

....

(")

X

5/ll/59

328/298

10/1848

None

None

None

['-'i
~

~

Not yet

None

X

1/1/60

350/2

X

3/15/61

398/318

11/745

None (NC)

None

None

3513

28/107

55816

3517

28/1195

55830

t)0

N>
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~

APPENDIX C (Continued)

#

Date
Done

64.

2/10/59
G28

65

2/18/59
G29

66

3/10/59
G30

67

5/18/59
G!ll

68

5/23/59
G!l2

69

5/25/59
G33

70

5/29,59
G3

Title
Process-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be
Annexed to the Protocol Relating to Nego•
tiations for the Establishment of New
Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree•
ment on Tariffs and Trade
Eighth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Proces-Verbal Containing a Schedule To Be
Annexed to the Protocol Relating to Nego•
tiations for the Establishment of a New
Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree•
ment on Tariffs and Trade (BrazilBenelux)
Proces-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be
Annexed to the Protocol Relating to the
Negotiations for the Establishment of New
Schedule III-Brazil-to the General Agree·
ment on Tariffs and Trade (Brazil &: U.K.)
Proccs-Verbal Supplementary to the Proces•
Verbal Containing Schedules To Be An•
nexed to the Protocol Relating to Negotia•
tions for the Establishment of New Schedule
Ill-Brazil-to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (Brazil & U.S.)
Declaration on Relations Between Contracting
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the Government of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade

Signed
by
U.S.

Date
In
Force

.N>

U.N.T.S.
Cite

Stat. or
U,S.T.
Cite

Pres.
Proc.

Fed.
Reg.
Cite

O')

T.D.
Number

X

Not yet

None

None

None

None

X

Not yet

None

None (NC)

None

None

~

....
i'

g.

~

Not yet

None

None

None

None

t-,4
~

~

~

Cl)

Not yet

None

None

None

None

....

<:!
Cl)

~

X

Not yet

None

X

11/16/59

346/312

X

10/9/59

344/304

3517

28/1195

55830

10/2142

None

None

None

1

10/2135

None

None

None

~

8l

~

71
72

8/17/59
G35
11/9/59
G36

73

11/12/59
G37

74

II/13/59
G38

75

76
77

11/19/59
G39
11/18/60
G40
11/19/60
G41

78

11/19/60
G42

79

11/19/60
G43

80

12(:J;I

Ninth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Texts of the Schedules to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on Relations Between Contracting
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the Government of the
Polish Peoples Republic
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
Tunisia to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Proces-Verbal Containing Schedules To Be
Annexed to the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of the Swiss Confederation
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Gapan and Switzerland)
Proces-Verbal Further Extending the Validity
of the Declaration Extending the Standstill
Provisions Article 16:4 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
Argentina to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Continued Application of
Schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions
of Article 16:4 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Extension of Standstill
Provisions of Article 16:4 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on
the Provisional Accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade

ti
,.
n

X

Not yet

None

None(NC)

None

None

8

C'

...ij

<O

0>

X

ll/16/60

381/386

11/2580

3513

28/107

55816

X

5/21/60

376/406

11/1538

3513

28/107

55816

.:::l

~
~
~

4/29/60

358/258

X

1/1/60

349/314

X

10/14/62
Did not
enter
into
force

442/302

X

II/14/62

445/294

X

11/14/62

X

12/9/61

ll/1299

13/2190

None

None

None

None

None

None

3513

28/107

55816

...
~

s~
bC
~

.......~
("\

None

None

None

None

13/2605

3513

28/107

55816

445/304

15/2571

None

None

None

424/324

13/184

None

None

None

~

t::i

~
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APPENDIX C (Continued)

#

Date
Done

81

11/12/61
G45

82

4lfJ:2

83

4/6/62
G47
4/6/62
G4S
1116t62
G4

84
85

86
87

11/7/62
G50
11/13/62
G51

88

11/13/62
G52

89

1/28/63
G53

90

5/6/63
G54

91

1/7/63
G55

Title
Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on
the Provisional Accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Israel to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Cambodia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Portugal to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade Embodying Results of the
1960-61 Tariff Conference
Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on
the Provisional Accession of Argentina
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
the United Arab Republic to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Tenth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Japan &: New Zealand)
Protocol Supplementary to the Protocol to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Embodying Results of the 1960-61 Tariff
Conference.
Protocol for the Accession of Spain to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(X)

Signed
by
U.S.

Date
In
Force

U.N.T.S.
Cite

X

1/8/62

424/334

13/189

X

7/5/62

431/244

13/2806

X

Not yet

X
X
X

Stat. or
U.S.T.
Cite

None

Fed.
Reg.
Cite

T.D.
Number

3513

28/107

55816

3479

27/5929

55649

3513

28/107

55816

Pres.
Proc.

5/6/62

431/208

13/2739

3479

27/5929

55649

8/15/62

440/2

13/2885

3513
3517

28/107
28/1195

55816
55830

11/20/62

452/290

13/3900

3517

28/1195

55830

~

....
i'
c-.

~

~

t'-1

i:l

~

~

....

~

~

X

4/28/63

462/330

X

1/9/63

452/298

8/15/63

476/254

7/7/63

501/304

None

None

None

14/292

3596

29/9419

None

14/1052

None(NC)

None

None

None(NC)

None

None

Cl>

~

'<!
X

8/29/63

476/264

15/2571

3553

28/9859

None

~

O'I
O'I

...

~

<0

92

93
94

12/12/63
G56
3f5J64
G7
3/5/i64
GB

95

96

10/30/64
G59
10/30/64
G60

97

10/80/64
G61

98

2/8/65
G62

99

12/14/65
G63

100

12b1:J65

101

12/l•r5
G6

Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of Tunisia
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Second Declaration on the Extension of the
Standstill Provisions of Article 16:4 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Declaration on the Provisional Accession of
Iceland to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of the
Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Second Proces-Vcrbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on
the Provisional Accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol Amending the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part
IV on Trade and Development
Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of Tunisia
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on
the Provisional Accession of Iceland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

ti
,.
n

8er
X

11/24/64

None

525/278

None

None

~

tO

C,

X

3/5/64

525/308

X

4/19/64

496/326

X

11/25/64

X

11/25/64

None

None

None

15/2067

None

None

None

525/270

15/2425

None

None

None

525/288

15/2417

None

None

None

.::?

~

~
~

;;·

s~
bC

X

11/25/64

X

6/27/66

525/298

15/2409

None

None

None

None

None

None

~
~
.....

....

C'\

None

t"'I
l::i

~

X

1/6/66

None

None

None

None

X

12/28/65

None

None

None

None

X

12/28/65

None

None

None

None

(;I)
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APPENDIX C (Continued)

#

Date
Done

102

4/1/66
G66

10!)

7/20/66
G67

104

11/17 /66
G68

105

106
107
108
109
110
Ill

112
1111

11/17 /66
G69
3/2/67
G70
10~1/62
G l(a)
5~1/67
G l(b)
6/30/67
G72
6/30/67
G73
6/30/67
G74
6/30/67
G75
6/30/67
G76

Title
Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Yugoslavia to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade
Third Proces-Verbal Extending the Declara•
tion on the Provisional Accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
Second Proces-Verbal Extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of the
United Arab Republic to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Protocol for the Accession of Korea to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Long-Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles,f
Protocol Extending the Agreement Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles of
I October 1962,f
Geneva (1967) Protocol to GATTg
Agreement Relating Principally to Chemicals,
Supp. Geneva Prot.
Memorandum of Agreement on ••• World
Grains Arrangement
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
Protocol for the Accession of Argentina

()0
t)I)

Stat. or
U.S,T.
Cite

Date
In
Force

U.N.T,S.
Cite

X

8/1/66

None

None

None

None

X

8/25/66

None

None

None

None

X

1/9/67

None

None

None

None

1/18/67

None

None

None

None

4/14/67

None

None

None

None

Pres,
Proc.

Fed.
Reg.
Cite

0

Signed
by
U.S.

T.D,
Number

...B-~

i'
~

X

X

10/1/62

471/296

t--i
~

~

~

...~
~

~

X
X

10/1/67

None

X

X
X
X

1
10/11/67

0,
0,

~

""'

10

t,

114

115
116

6/80/67
G77
6/80/67
G78
6/80/67
G79

i

Protocol for the Accession of Iceland
Protocol for the Accession of Ireland
Protocol for the Accession of Poland

12/22/67
10/18/67

a Supplemented by Presidential Proclamations 2764, 2769, 2782, 2784, 2791, 2792, 2798, 2829, 2865. Certain parts of GATT, namely, the foreign
nation tariff schedules and certain annexes, were not proclaimed. The object of Proclamation 2761A is to proclaim "such modifications of existing
duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported
into the United States of America as are specified or provided for in parts I, II, and III, annexes D, H, and I, and part I of, and the general notes in,
schedule XX of said general agreement •••• " GATT is in force only through the Protocol of Provisional Application (#2).
b Supplemented by Presidential Proclamation 2809.
c Supplemented by Presidential Proclamations 2874, 2884, 2888.
d These are not international agreements but decisions under art. XXXIII of GATT and probably need not have been deposited. The practice in
later years has been not to deposit decisions regarding accession.
o These three agreements, although listed in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/8, Rev. 2, Ch. 1, are not truly "GATT agreements." Since they relate so
closely to GATT, it is convenient to include them here.
t The Cotton Textile agreements are deposited at GATT since, although they do not modify GATT, they relate to GATT. Consideration of
these agreements is outside the scope of this article.
g This and the next seven agreements were the results of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations which were completed June 80, 1967. As of this
writing, only two had entered into force although others should do so in the near future. The author has been informed that the United States will
soon proclaim certain of these agreements.
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APPENDIX D
United States Trade Agreements Acts

N)

The following list of the trade agreements acts since 1934 sets out the period when each act's trade agreement authority was effective. In some
acts, portions of the authority granted lapsed after a given time, while other portions retained effectiveness until specifically repealed. Where this is
the case, only the former expiration date is listed. Numbers separated by a slash indicate volume before, page number or public law number after.
Year

Title

1934

An act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930,
Part III
Joint Resolution to extend the authority
of President under § 350 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended
Joint Resolution to extend the authority
of the President under § 350 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
Joint Resolution to extend the authority
of the President under § 350 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
An act to extend the authority of the
President under § 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 and for other purposes
Trade .Agreements Extension Act of 1948
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1949
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953
.An act to extend the authority of the
President under § 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955
Trade Agreements Extension .Act of 1958
Trade Expansion Act of 1962

1937
1940
1943
1945
1948
1949
1951

1953
1954
1955
1958
1962

• Public Resolution.

House
Report

Senate
Report

Congress/
Session

6/12/37

1000

871

73d/2d

3/1/37

6/12/40

166

lll

75th/1st

4/12/40

6/12/43

1594

1297

76th/3d

Pub.
Law

Date
Effective

1351-66

316

6/12/34

50/24

1351-66

•10

54/107

1351-66

•61

Stat.

19USC §§

48/943

Date
Expired

~

....
i'

s.

;:3

t--t
I:)
57/125

1351-66

66

6/7/43

6/12/45

409

258

78th/1st

~

:=ti
~

59/410
62/1053
63/697
65/72
67/472

1351-66
1351-66
1351-66
1351-66
1351-66

215

68/360
69/162
72/673
76/872

1351-66
1351-66
1351-66
1801-1991

464
86
85-686
87-794

129
792
307
50

7/5/45
6/26/48
9/26/49
6/16/51
8/7/53

6/12/48
6/30/49
6/12/51
6/12/53
6/12/54

594
2009
19
14
521

352
1558
107
299
472

79th/1st
80th/2d
81st/1st
82d/1st
83d/1st

7/1/54
6/21/55
8/20/58
10/11/62

6/12/55
6/30/58
6/30/62
6/30/67

1777
50
1761
1818

1605
232
1838
2059

83d/2d
84th/1st
85th/2d
87th/2d

....
i::!

~

~

